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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
 The European Union (EU) is an International Organisation of integration. When acting 
in the international arena, the EU becomes a single big power representing the 27 Member 
States (MMSS). However, the EU does not have a common single voice in Foreign Policy. 
Security is a crucial sector for all States. Therefore, they do not want to share these 
competencies with the Union.  
  
   The Treaty of Lisbon reformed the Treaty of the European Union (TUE) and the Treaty 
of Functioning of the European Union (TFUE). The TUE, in article 27.21 exposes that the High 
Representative of Foreign Affairs and Security Policy shall represent the EU in talks with third 
states, in international organisations and international conferences. In article 342 of the TUE, it 
is reflected that the MMSS shall coordinate their actions in international organisations. This 
article has been present since 1957 even though it has evolved in the different reforming treaties. 
Since its creation, the EU has desired acting with a single voice in the different International 
Organisations. Nonetheless, the Treaty of Lisbon increased the High Representative's power 
and functions and created the European Diplomatic Body. That is why there is the belief that 
this Treaty changed the EU's behaviour in the international organisations and the MMSS 
approach on Foreign Affairs. 
 
     Yet, the EU is aware of its role in the world and that they need to engage to be more 
powerful. International Security is not an exception. The principal problem here is that the EU 
States have opposite views in the arena. There are the Nuclear States like France and the United 
Kingdom and the Neutral States as Austria, Cyprus, Ireland, Malta and Sweden. 
 
 International Organisations are focusing on International Security. There are the United 
Nations, the NATO and the EU itself also has two programs (CFSP and CSDP). Nonetheless, 
not all the MMSS take part in all the mentioned programs. The United Nations is the only 
security and defence international organisation where all the European Union Member States 
are present. The EU in the TUE exposes clearly that the United Nations are an important forum 
for them. Then, they are willing to be part and engage in talks with it. However, they must do 
it through its MMSS. 
 
This is why this analysis will focus on the EU's MMSS action and behaviour in the 
United Nations. The UN is enormous and different areas work on International Security as the 
Security Council, the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) or the United 
Nations General Assembly, institution in which drafts is going to focus. This has different 
Committees and the study will concentrate on the First which is the responsibility for the 
Disarmament and International Security.   
 
1 The High Representative shall represent the Union for matters relating to the common foreign and security policy. 
He shall conduct political dialogue with third parties on the Union's behalf and shall express the Union's position 
in international organisations and at international conferences. 
2 Member States shall coordinate their action in international organisations and at international conferences. They 
shall uphold the Union's positions in such forums. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy shall organise this coordination. 
In international organisations and at international conferences where not all the Member States participate, those 
which do take part shall uphold the Union's positions. 
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The UNGA has been the selected institution because many studies have studied the 
European Union action, through its Member States, in its different periods. Most of the 
mentioned papers centre themselves on the voting pattern in the plenary3 and its working 
groups4. These investigations conduce to focus mostly on the committees where the EU’s voting 
is more homogenous as the Third that focuses on Social, Humanitarian and Cultural affairs5. 
These tend to just mention the First Committee (C.1) as the exception of the homogeneity. Since 
the Disarmament Committee is a new space of research. The lack of information on the topic 
will force this analysis to start from the basis. There are no studies who have only examined the 
C.1  or how the EU has acted in the International Security and Disarmament Committee. 
 
Therefore, this research focuses on a long-time study gap, the European Union MMSS 
action on the United Nations General Assembly’s C.1 . Also, it is important to remark that the 
majority of the studies mentioned are old. They were written on the 90s or the early 21st century 
and adjusted mostly on the period between the 1970s and the 1990s6. 
 
Hence, this study intends to fill this gap and it will try to find the logic on this 
Committee. It will explain the different actors who take part in the process and which of those 
are the most important. Also, it will comprehend the literature that analysed the voting pattern 
to actualize the data and to detect the differences between topics and years. 
 
Besides, this paper will also explain why voting homogeneity is lower in this area than 
in the others. Moreover, it will try to identify to which extend the different Member States act 
as a sovereign State or as an EU member. 
 
Further, it will analyse if the changes and the new actors introduced in the 
actualizations of the Treaty on the European Union made any difference on the hegemony or in 
the process to coordinate the MMSS action on Committee. 
 
The UN has had more than 70 sessions. However, the analysis will just follow a short 
period of time. To be able to examine the impact of the Lisbon Treaty, the analysis will focus 
on the period 2008-2018 to visualize what happened before and after the treaty was effective. 
 
     As a brief, this study wants to put light on the EU’s action on the United Nations 
General Assembly First Committee and the process with which the EU tries to construct the 
coordination exposed in the art. 34 (TUE) and to which extend the Member States follow this 
article. This is why the research question of this study is: Has the EU acted with a single voice 
in the United Nations General Assembly First Committee (Disarmament and International 
Security) since the Lisbon Treaty?   
 
3 LUIF, P. EU cohesion in the UN General Assembly, Paris, European Union Institute for Security Studies, 
2003, pp.1-75 
4 YOUNG, H. Y REES, N. “ EU Voting Behaviour in the UN General Assembly, 1990-2002: The EU's 
Europeanising Tendencies.” Irish Studies in International Affairs vol. 16, 2005, pp. 193–207 
5 SMITH, K “EU member states at the UN: a case of Europeanisation arrested?”, LSE Research Online, 2016, pp. 
1-28 
6 LUIF, P. opt.cite, note.3 
YOUNG, H. Y REES, N.  opt.cite, note.4 
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From the question, there are some hypothesis deduced. These hypotheses are the 
followings:  
 
• The EU Member States have increased their cohesion in the First Committee since the 
Lisbon Treaty came into effect.  
• It is impossible that the EU is going to act with a single voice because of the Nuclear 
States and the Neutral states.  
•  The OTAN membership has a tremendous influence on the voting pattern.  
 
This study will firstly analyse the literature to see the main scholar researches in the 
field. Next, the methodological explanation where there is an explanation of the main data used 
and the different methods that are used to extract and understand the information. The data 
analysis will follow the chronological process with which the EU constructs the single voice 
and define the different participants. Also, this part will comprehend the vote and the main 
priorities and proposals of the EU. Finally, there will be conclusions which will also focus on 
the new lines of research.  
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 European Foreign Policy  
The European foreign policy has been an important area since the early '50s. It was not 
part of the Treaties of Rome due to the failure of the European Defence Community (EDC).  
The EDC was a project started in the 1950s that was meant to create the European Army and a 
military alliance between its members. It was supposed to be a parallel organisation to the EEC. 
The design contained the same organs exposed in the Treaty of Rome although it already 
constitutionalized the Heads of State meetings7. This organisation failed because France did not 
ratify its Treaty.  Anyway, the European Economic Community started to connect whit Third 
states and to have a foreign presence through other areas. The ECC build bilateral economic 
agreements, represented its MMSS at the GATT Rounds and contributed to economic and 
development aid8 . Therefore, it can affirm that the EU's first international arena was the 
economic one.   
 
 Unity in other international organisations has been a written agreement since the Rome 
Treaty9. Over the different modifications of the TFUE, this attitude has not changed. This 
definition has been enriched by new processes and mechanisms with which the common 
positions are arranged more effectively in the enlarging union. 
 
 It was in 1973, the Copenhagen Report established the European Political Cooperation 
(EPC). The EPC created the regular meetings of the Foreign Affairs Ministers of the Member 
States. These reunions aimed to coordinate the EU foreign actions. The EPC established the 
 
7 GLOCKNER, I AND RITTBERGER, B. Designing the European Union. From Paris to Lisbon, Chapter The 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and European Defense Community (EDC) Treaties, Palgrave 
Mcmillan, New York, 2012, 1-308, p.16-23 
8 BINDI, F. The Foreign Policy of the European Union Assessing Europe’s Role in the World, Chapter European 
Union Foreign Policy: A Historical Overview, Brookings Institution Press, Washington D.C, 2010, pp. 13-48, 
p.14 
9 LUIF, P. opt. cite. note 3,  p. 16 
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creation of different organs as the “Group of Correspondents" and the working groups who 
oversaw preparing the meetings10. The first working groups created were focused on: 
 
• the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) 
• the Middle East 
• the Mediterranean 
• Asia 
 
 This also established that the different ambassadors on the EEC would consult each 
other. At the end of 1973, the EPC adopted the "Declaration on European Identity" where they 
exposed the role the EU had to play in the world. One of the elements they specified was their 
plan to progressively determine common positions in the sphere of foreign policy11.  
  
 In the beginning, they used to disagree on the Middle East until the Six-Day War when 
they reaffirmed Palestine's right to self-determination12. At the end of the '80s the European 
Single Act, which was the first review of the treaties was approved and supposed the 
strengthening of the cooperation on foreign affairs.  
 
 In 1992, the Maastricht Treaty was signed. There, the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP) was created. The CFSP was an inter-governmental "pillar". The CFSP allowed 
the EU to start the talks on defence that had previously been impossible and unthinkable. Before 
it was signed, the European Council released the Lisbon Report where they introduced the 
principal geographic areas and topics the EU had to work on13. These regions were: 
 
• Eastern Europe (including Eurasia) 
• The Balkans 
• Maghreb and the Middle East 
• Transatlantic relations (the United States and Canada) 
• The North-South dimension (Africa, Latin America, the Caribbean, and Asia) and 
Japan.  
• The CSCE process and the policy of disarmament and arms control in 
• Europe, including confidence-building measures 
• Nuclear and non-proliferation issues 
• The economic aspect of security 
• Control of the transfer of military technology to third countries and control of arms 
exports. 
 
 At the late '90s, the EU started the construction of the European Security and Defence 
Identity. This project let the EU to act on some occasions in collaboration with NATO14.  
 
 
10 BINDI, F. opt. cite.  note 8, p.19 
11 BINDI, F. opt. cite. note , p.19 
12 BINDI, F. opt. cite. note 8, p.21 
13 BINDI, F. opt. cite. note 8, p.27-28 
14 BINDI, F. opt. cite. note 8, p.29 
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 The Amsterdam Treaty created the High Representative of the CFSP. He had to 
coordinate the new Policy Unite regarding Foreign Affairs. The High Representative also 
published different reports stating which were the EU priorities and its opportunities15.  
 
 In 2009 the Treaty of Lisbon was effective. In this Treaty, the Rome and the Maastricht 
Treaties were modified. The European Exterior Action Service was stablished. This is an 
institution where functionary and diplomats from the different states are in charge of:  
 
• The coordination of the CFSP and the new CSDP (Common Security and Defence 
Policy) programs  
• Preparing the different meetings led by the High Representative)16 
• Representing the EU in International Organisations and International events 
• Ambassadors on the European Commission Delegations and the European Union 
Representations 
  
 The Foreign Policy has become more centred in Brussels over time. This process of 
centralization of the policy decision on the EU capital is called Brusselization. This concept 
was developed by Allen in 1998. He defined it as “a gradual transfer in the name of consistency, 
of foreign policy authority away from the national capitals to Brussels”17.  
 
2.2. United Nations  
 
 The European Union is not a United Nations (UN) member. The United Nations is an 
International Organisation formed by States. Therefore, the EU, as an International 
Organisation, cannot be a member of the UN. 
 
 However, it can act at the UN directly and indirectly in the UN. Directly, the EU mostly 
acts as an economic supporter. It is a major donor to the United Nations development projects, 
and it is also an interlocutor of the UN due to its commitment to create a global forum and to 
promote multilateralism 18 . Due to the success of the bilateral dialogue between the two 
Organisations, 26 UN agencies have offices in Brussels19.  
 
The EU is an observant member of the whole United Nations Organization. It has also 
been able to be included on the speaking list in the sessions and work of the General Assembly 
as well as in its committees and working groups since 2011. This was brought about after the 
approval of Resolution 65/275. Since this moment, the EU Delegation has substituted the 
rotating presidencies in the coordination of the UNGA topics and has spoken in the name of the 
27 or 28 member states in the Assembly since. However, the EU is not the only observer who 
 
15 BINDI, F. opt. cite. note 8, p.35 
16 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, The Lisbon Treaty: a brief guide, Delegation of the European Union to India 
[online], 2010, pp.1-15 p.9. Available in: 
https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eu_lisbon_treaty_guide_22_04_2010.pdf 
17 LARIVÉ, M.H.A, Debating European Security and Defense Policy: Understanding the Complexity, Routledge, 
New York, 2016, pp. 320, p.40, 
18 YOUNG, H. Y REES, N. op.cite, note.4, p.206 
19 OECD, OECD Development Co-operation Peer Reviews OECD Development Assistance Peer Reviews: 
European Union 2012, 2013, OECD Publishing, p.1-120, p.59 
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can speak; the Holy Site and Palestine also have this right20. The EU has voting power in some 
UN organizations like the FAO21  and it is a party in more than 50 conventions or multilateral 
agreements where it normally is the only non-state participant22.  Some of the conventions 
where the EU is a party include the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities; the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change; the United Nations 
Convention to Combat Desertification in Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or 
Desertification, Particularly in Africa; the United Nations Convention Against Corruption and 
the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime23. 
 As Hanna Ojanen argued, the EU is one of the biggest political influences without 
being a member of the Organization. As mentioned, since 2011, the European Commission 
addresses the UNGA in behalf of the EU24. Trying to study this influence, there has been an 
academic debate on the role of the EU at the Security Council. However, the UNGA has not 
been as analysed and it is a very interesting political arena to study the EU25 because the UNGA 
is the institution were many decisions are decided. Some of their competences and most 
important goals are26:  
• International Law codification 
• Approves resolutions as the Sustainable Development Goals.  
• Appoints the non-permanent members of the Security Council and the Secretary-
General following the Security Council’s recommendations 
• Makes recommendations and suggestions on peace maintenance if the Security Council 
is not discussing it 
• Following the Uniting for Peace resolution they can take action if there are cases of 
threat to the peace or an act of aggression and the Security Council has failed to act 
because of the negative vote of a permanent member.  
  
 Indirectly, the EU politically acts under its Member States in the main institutions- the 
UNGA and the UNSC. The EU MMSS represent the EU and its interest. There, under a twisted 
and long coordination process, the States share their common positions and act as a block. This 
block is important for two main causes: 
 
 
20 EUROPEAN COUNCIL, Relations Between the European Union and the United Nations, September 2011, 
[online] Consulted 4th May 2019, Available at: 
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/124604.pdf 
21 OJANEN, H. “The EU and the UN: a shared future” Helsinki, FIIA Report 13/2006, The Finnish Institute of 
International Affairs, 2006, pp. 1-52, p. 11 
22 OECD, opt.cite note. 18, p.59 
23 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Treaties Office Database [online] Consulted 4th May 2019, Available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/searchByType.do?id=2  
24 EUROPEAN COUNCIL, EU at the UN General Assembly, Brussels, 6th March 2020. [online]  Consulted in 5th 
March 2020, Available: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/unga/  
25 OJANEN, H. opt. cite.  note 21, p8 
26 UNITED NATIONS, Functions and powers of the General Assembly, [online]  Consulted 1rst May 2020, 
Available at: https://www.un.org/en/ga/about/background.shtml  
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1. The first cause is the globe voting blocks in which the UNGA is divided. Following this 
division, the EU member states are in 3 of the 5 blocks27:  
 
• WESTERN EUROPEAN AND OTHER GROUP: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.  
• EASTERN EUROPEAN GROUP: BULGARIA, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia 
• ASIAN GROUP: Cyprus 
 
 The global influence and power that the system gives to the EU are enormous and the 
EU does take advantage of it by being overrepresented in the different institutions and hence, 
having more power than if considered as a unique group would have28. The groups are relevant 
in the distribution of the seats on bodies and other delegated institutions. Therefore, at having 
members on different groups the EU can see itself overrepresented in somebodies due to this 
regional distribution.29  
 
2. The second one is that the EU single voice does not only affect the 27 or 28 MMSS. There 
usually is an average of 15 countries who tend to align to the EU action. These countries 
are the EFTA countries as Norway, Switzerland, Iceland and Liechtenstein, the European 
microstate of Andorra and the enlargement candidates as Albania, Montenegro or Turkey.30  
 
 
2.3 The EU at the UN 
 
 The studies that have focused on the EU’s action at the UNGA observed and explained 
the evolution of voting unity with the different changes that the EU internal legislation has 
undergone regarding the position of Member States on other International Organizations31.  
 
 In the 50s and 60s, there was unity upon Human Rights and Israel, and this was explicit 
on the UNGA because the MMSS voted the same on the resolutions related to those topics. It 
the 70s the pattern was reinforced because it raised upon a 60% of unity on the voting. This 
homogeneity continued to the 80s and in the early 90s, it was reduced to 50%. In 1992, the 
single voice resumed, and it went to the 80s average percentage. Notwithstanding, as the authors 
exposed, security issues showed a smaller cohesion. Sadly, the literature does not share the 
percentage of the C.1  individually, they expose the results as the outcome of all the UNGA 
votes in the 6 Committees and the Plenary. Consequently, there is no information on to which 
extent did the 1rst Committee represent a decrease in the single voice construction.  
 
27 DEGRAND-GUILLAUD, A. “Actors and Mechanisms of EU coordination at the UN” European Foreign Affairs 
Review, vol. 14, 2009, pp. 405-430, p. 411 
LUIF, P. opt. cite. note 3, p.7 
28 LUIF, P. opt. cite. note 3 
29 PERMANENT MISSION OF SWITZERLAND TO THE UNITED NATIONS. The GA Handbook A practical guide to the 
United Nations General Assembly, 2017, pp. 138, p. 62, available: https://www.eda.admin.ch/dam/mission-new-
york/en/documents/UN_GA__Final.pdf  
30 LUIF, P. opt. cite. note 3, p. 52 
31 OJANEN, H. opt. cite.  note 21 
31 LUIF, P. opt. cite. note 3 
31 YOUNG, H. AND REES, N. opt. cite. note 4 
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 The process developed to produce the single voice is unclear despite knowing all the 
different actors who take part in the process32. As Anne Degrand-Guillaud defined, internal 
coordination is kept hidden behind a closed door33.  Even though she produced an extremely 
detailed study on how the coordination was developed and gave the EU some lines to follow in 
the revision on the process, that was written at the same time to Lisbon Treaty was being 
formulated.  
 
 Scholars 34have also put the accent on the prevalent role that the EU Council presidency 
has on the single voice construction and the known-how relation between the EU delegation 
and the national embassies. Sadly, most of the studies are more than 10 years old and their 
results can only be considered as a guideline to study and analyse the current EU consensus 
construction. That is why when explaining the process found in the literature, the descriptions 
will be exposed in the past tenses. 
 
 The coordination, before the Lisbon Treaty, was produced both in New York (NY) and 
Brussels35. In Brussels, there was permanent coordination between the European Commission, 
the Committees and the working groups, the COREPER, the Council Secretariat and the 
Council. In New York meetings were held in the second semester, that is when the UNGA 
plenaries are held (they start in September). In NY, the EU Presidency had the leading voice 
and it was who reunited and promoted the policies. In the coordination also participated the EU 
Commission- who is a UNGA observer-, the EU Delegation, the 28 states representants, the 
representation of the European Communities (2009 text) and the Council office on NY36.  
 
 State representants held a dual position, they informed the EU Presidency of its State 
position and they informed their State of the EU common position. The NY process is defined 
in the figure 1.  
FIGURE 1 
Source: Extracted from Actors and Mechanisms of EU coordination at the UN p.420 
 
32 The Commission, the Council, the Member States, the Member States embassies at the UN in NY, the EEAS 
and depending on the Committee some Commissions 
33 DEGRAND-GUILLAUD, A. opt. cite. note 27, p.405 
34 LUIF, P. opt. cite. note 3, p.13 
34 YOUNG, H. AND REES, N. opt. cite. note 4, p.206 
35 DEGRAND-GUILLAUD, A. opt. cite. note 27, p.407 
35 LUIF, P. opt. cite. note 3, p.13-15 
36 DEGRAND-GUILLAUD, A. opt. cite. note 27 
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 On security issues, there was also the Political and Security Committee (PSC) who 
helped define the policies, exercised control and provided strategic control of the CFSP. The 
PSC assisted the construction of the EU opinion as a complementary actor to the COREPER 
and its working groups37.. It is important to mention that the PSC changed its role in the Lisbon 
Treaty. The pre-Lisbon formation of the First Committee common position can be seen in 
Figure 2. 
 
FIGURE 2 
Source: Extracted from Actors and Mechanisms of EU coordination at the UN p.417 
 
 It is very relevant that the EU has a delegation at the UN. This is not a normal 
international office of the EU abroad because these are normally European Commission 
Delegations and the NY one is not managed by the Commission; it is the representation of the 
European Union as a whole. The fact that when the EU Office at the UN opened in 1974 and it 
was already settled to represent the whole spectrum of European Institutions and interests38 
reinforces the importance of the UN. Is in these arenas where the post-modern diplomacy of 
the EU is visible as a whole. The post-modern diplomacy is defined by the cooperation between 
the actors to develop agreements and common understanding with bilateral action39. 
 
 One of the main gaps in literature is the role of the new reinforced High Representative 
of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR-FASP) and the European Exterior 
Action Service (EEAS)40 on the decision-making structure.   
 
 The only recent study that developed this gap was published in 2016 and focused on the 
EU action on the 3rd Committee that is the Human Rights Committee of the UNGA. The 
analysis done by Karen Smith gave the Human Rights Commission in Brussels the main role 
in creating the common position and therefore, suggested a Brusselization 41  on the making of 
 
37 DEGRAND-GUILLAUD, A opt. cite. note 27, p.415-416 
38 COMMELLI, M. Y MATARAZZO, R “Rehashed Commission Delegations or Real Embassies? EU Delegations 
Post-Lisbon”, IAI Working Papers, vol 11, 2011, pp. 1-13, p.10-11 
39 BÁTORA, J. Y HOCKING, B “Bilateral Diplomacy in the European Union: Towards “post-modern” patterns?”, 
Netherlands Institute of International Relations “Clingendeal”, Discussion papers on diplomacy, 2008, pp.1-28, p. 
22-23 
40 DEGRAND-GUILLAUD, A opt. cite. note 27, p. 411 
41 SMITH, K. opt. cite note 5, p.4 
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the single voice. It follows and accounts the statements released on HR by the EU on the UN 
and as the EU as an actor. Smith concludes that the Lisbon procedural changes had not had a 
very important impact on the HR Committee42. 
 
 The United Nations has different Committees in which they centre in different topics. 
The different Committees are: 1rst, Disarmament and International Security: 2nd, Economical 
and Financial; 3rd, Social, Humanitarian and Cultural; 4th, Special Political and 
Decolonisation; 5th, Administrative and Budgetary and 6th, Legal. 
 
 This study is set to study the security of the EU common position on the First 
Committee. This Committee was created in 1945 and as the UN describes it, the 1rst 
Committee:  
 
“[…] deals with disarmament, global challenges and threats to peace that affect the international 
community and seeks out solutions to the challenges in the international security regime. It considers all 
disarmament and international security matters within the scope of the Charter or relating to the powers 
and functions of any other organ of the United Nations; the general principles of cooperation in the 
maintenance of international peace and security, as well as principles governing disarmament and the 
regulation of armaments; promotion of cooperative arrangements and measures aimed at strengthening 
stability through lower levels of armaments”43 
 
Scholars44 have agreed that the security policy and foreign affairs subjects were an 
exception in all the aspects. The Foreign Policy and International Security are not EU 
competences45. This is an area where states coordinate and coordinate. It is a supranational 
arena where States have the last word on the decisions and where they do not need to agree or 
commit. This is what makes the EU single voice construction in the UN First Committee more 
difficult than in other areas.  However, it is still an uncertain area to study because not many 
studies have focused to understand the EU foreign policy on the UN46 and as Degrand-Guillaud 
exposed, there is no transparency on the decision-making process.  
 
In this Committee, there is a definite decrease in the single voice percentage. 7 States 
usually act opposite the EU standards that are France and the United Kingdom (nuclear 
countries and Security Council permanent members) and Austria, Finland, Ireland, Malta and 
Sweden (neutral countries)47.  
 
 The study of the C.1 of the UNGA supposes to study the common position on the less 
institutionalized area of the EU, the Foreign Policy. It is considered that analysing the EU’s 
 
42 SMITH, K. opt. cite note 5, p.21 
43 UNITED NATIONS, Disarmament and International Security (First Committee), New York, Consulted March 
10th 2020,  Available at:  https://www.un.org/en/ga/first/index.shtml   
44 DEGRAND-GUILLAUD, A. opt. cite. note 27 
44 OJANEN, H. opt. cites.  note 21 
44 LUIF, P. opt. cite. note 3 
44 YOUNG, H. Y REES, N. opt. cite. note 4, p.206 
45 EU-LEX, Division of competences within the European Union, Brussels, last update 2016, Consulted February 
10th 2020, available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM%3Aai0020  
46 JORGANSEN, K.E Y LAATIKAINEN, K. “The European Union and the United Nations”  
47 LUIF, P. opt. cite. note 3, p.31 
47 YOUNG, H. Y REES, N. opt. cite. note 4, p.198-199 
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behaviour in this area will enrich the European Union multilateral literature and will give some 
ideas on how the EU sees itself in the international security and defence arena.  
 
3. METHODOLOGY  
 
A mixt analysis with a dual approach through qualitative and quantitative data will be 
conducted to complement each other to develop a strong response to the thesis hypothesis. The 
process by which quantitative data becomes qualitative is called qualitizing and it is made to 
extract more information from the quantitative data48. This method has been chosen due to the 
strength that it gives to the results and it helps go further into the analysis due to the 
complementation of the data available to study.    
 
Therefore, the data analysis will be structured following the chronological approach 
concerning the process of the EU single voice construction entails. That is, starting from the 
qualitative methodology looking for the EU’s main topics and understanding the actors 
involved. Afterwards, looking to the quantitative data as the UN First Assembly and the results 
of the votes derived. Later on, understanding the actions and the motivations that make the EU 
Member States follow or divert from the EU's proposal.  
 
The quantitative data collection will be extracted from the UN First Assembly Reports. 
In this analysis, will be considered the voting reports data from 2008 to 2018. This will only 
focus on the Member States action. This is why Croatia's votes will be observed since 2013 that 
is the year when it became a member.  This information will be used in two parallel studies.  
 
The first one will consist of the voting analysis. This part will follow the voting 
approach mentioned in the literature review. The percentage will be used to compare the 
different year results because it is the best mechanism to compare the information. The 
unanimity in favour, against and the abstention will be considered. 
In the numeric analysis, this is going to be translated to the following code:  
 
•        in favour: 2 
•        abstention: 1  
•        against 0  
  
The codification permits identifying the unanimity when it is reached. It can be seen 
when the sum of all the 27 or 28 MMSS votes in the policies are 0, 27 or 46 from 2008 to 2012 
and from 2013 when the sum is 0, 28 or 48. This change is produced by the accession of Croatia 
to the Union. In the annexe, 10 tables, from table 22 to table 32, show the codification for each 
year. The observed policies in the tables and the ones considered in the analysis are not the only 
drafts that were brought to the UNGA First Committee session. However, these were the ones 
which vote was requested and recorded. 
 
 
48  SANDELOWSKI, M, “Focus on Research Methods Combining Qualitative and Quantitative Sampling, Data 
Collection, and Analysis Techniques in Mixed-Method Studies”, Chapel Hill, Research in Nursing & Health 
2000, 23, 246–255 
CEI, Centro Adscrito a la Universitat de Barcelona                                 Nº 3/2020, 2 DE SEPTIEMBRE DE 2020 
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The second use of the quantitative data is going to respond to see if there are patterns 
on the votes. This means that the voting results are going to analyse State by State to see if there 
are states who vote together through the years or if there are years where there seems to be more 
unanimity than others. Therefore, we are going to analyse the country’s votes to find identical 
patterns.  
 
Finally, complementing this mentioned approach there is also going to be a time 
comparison to see if there are thematic voting patterns as was suggested in the literature. On 
the literature, there was found an agreement between scholars that showed that the EU had one 
voice since the 50s regarding Palestine and the Middle East49. 
 
The first qualitative method that is going to be used to complete the results of the 
quantitative data is the Statements50, explanation of vote (EoV) released by the Delegation of 
the European Union to the United Nations - New York. These Statements are going to give 
information about the motivation behind the vote released by the European States. Therefore, 
this will be the first contextualization of the quantitative data and will provide some of the clues 
regarding the one voice construction.  
 
Furthermore, there is going to be a comparison between the voting data with the 
sponsorships51  the different EU countries did on different proposes to see which are the 
common priorities from the states and the EU. Hence, it is going to be contemplated as to how 
many states and through how many years the policies have been sponsored and to see if there 
is continuity on the sponsoring. 
 
There is going to be an analysis of the Opening Discourse52 made by the Council 
Presidency at the First Committee where the European Union general ideas on Disarmament 
and International Security are exposed. The motivation on this part is to compare the issues 
mentioned with the results to see into which extend the EU has reached to fulfil the one voice 
in its main issues. 
 
Finally, the interviews are the last qualitative data analysed. These will be realised to 
understand the one voice construction and to identify who are the actors who take part in the 
process. Besides, the interviews will also serve as a contextualization of the previous data and 
will provide more detail into their interpretation. Moreover, the interviews will also be used to 
identify the external factors that affect the states to facilitate or difficult the one voice 
construction on the C.1 of the United Nations General Assembly.  
An Ambassadors or high-level bureaucrats of Permanent Mission of Spain to the 
United Nations in New York, a high-level officer of the Spanish Foreign Affairs, European 
Union and Cooperation Ministry and an employee of the Spanish Permanent Representation to 
the European Union will be interviewed. The interviewed people will remain anonymous, that 
 
49 LUIF, P. opt. cite. note 3, p. 27 
49 BINDI, F. opt. cite. note 8, p.21 
50 EU Statements on First Committee issues are available in different webs; therefore, statements and explanation 
of the vote are going to be taken from two sources. The first one is a web called “Reaching Critical Will” and the 
second one is the Commission web in the EU at the UN.     
51 This data is also going to be extracted from the Reaching Critical Will data sources and from the UNODA web 
page. Also, some data has been extracted from the UN Documents and from the UN Digital Library. 
52 This Statements have been extracted from Reaching Critical Will (2008-2016) and from the EU Delegation in 
NY web page. 
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is why they will be referred to as “interviewed 1”, “interviewed 2” and “interviewed 3” in the 
order mentioned above due to confidentiality and informal questioning.   
 
To finish the data analysis, there is going to be a comparison of all the mentioned data:  
 
• Sponsorships 
• Voting reports  
• Explanation of Vote 
to have a final overview of the evolution and central topics and interest for the EU and analyse 
and understand which are the difficulties to the homogeneity.   
 
The draft code is the codification selected to classify the different proposals because this code 
is the one that follows the proposal since it is sponsored until it is approved. This code is: 
 
A/C.1/number of general assembly/L.number 
 
The A refers to the General Assembly, the C.1 to the First Committee, the number of the general 
assembly to identify the Session (the Sessions from the 63rd to the 73rd are the ones analysed 
in this paper) and finally the L. code that is an L. with a number that codifies the years' drafts.  
 
4. DATA ANALYSYS: PROCESS CONSTRUCTION.   
 
The process of the policies in a first overlook could be described as 1. Setting the EU 
priorities; 2. Proposals sponsorships and setting individual priorities; 3. EU meetings in NY; 4. 
EU opening discourse and main priorities exposed; 5. Voting and 6 Explanation of the vote. 
 
 4.1. Brussels, setting the EU priorities  
 
All the United Nations decisions process start in Brussels. As it has been explained by 
"interviewed 2" who works on the Spanish Foreign Affairs, European Union and Cooperation 
Ministry, the Brussels process follows the following structure: 
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  FIGURE 3 
 
Source: own construction  
The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the 
European Exterior Action Service (EEAS) are the ones starting the process and the ones who 
sent the proposals to be analysed. The competent working groups are the ones who start the UN 
proposals study. The study passes to the Coreper II, which is composed of the 27 or 28 State 
Representatives to the European Union. After the Coreper II has studied the proposal, this goes 
to the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC). In the FAC, the Foreign Affairs Ministers decide the 
position the EU has on the different proposal and, they sent them to the New York 
Representation. There is the option to move this debate to the European Council if the FAC 
demands it. It normally happens if the debate collapses in the FAC or if the topic is too 
controversial.  In the European Council, the 27 or 28 Head of State analyse the proposals.  
Concurrently, in the Political and Security Council (PSC) the debate is addressed. This 
Committee controls the CFSP and the CSDP. The PSC has other responsibilities, but those are 
53not relevant to the analysis so, there are not mentioned .  
In the PSC, Committee led by the High Representative, the EEAS, and the 
Ambassadors to the PSC reunite twice a week to monitor and recommend policies and 
approaches to the situations relating the CFSP and the CSDP which are the supranational 
competences the EU coordinates. 
 
“Interviewed 3” who works on the Spanish Permanent Representation to the European 
Union, described the role of the PSC at the United Nations proposals. The PSC does not take 
part in all the processes or plans. It just acts in the projects related to the most strategic or the 
yearly priorities for the EU. It is the PSC who, as already mentioned, sets the priority and the 
strategy and focuses the main areas in which the EU must act or be part. Therefore, the PSC 
analyses the proposals and sets the specific priorities for the annual UNGA and the Ministerial 
Meetings at NY. 
 
Moreover, the EU proposals are analysed and strategically decided at the PSC. These 
sponsorships are sent to the Candidate States who generally join them. An illustration of this is 
multilateralism that, explained by "interviewed 3", multilateralism was the 2019 strategic 
priority and, they released documents and other work deeply on and strengthen the 
 
53 EUROPEAN COUNCIL, Political Security Committee, 2019, [online] available at: 
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-eu/preparatory-bodies/political-security-committee/  
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multilateralism in all the areas where it can be applied. To summarise, it can be seen that the 
EU in Brussels sets the priorities and the main proposals. They are produced both in the PSC, 
in the Coreper II and FAC. In Figure 4 there is illustrated the Brussels process. 
 
FIGURE 4 
 
Source: own construction  
 
 
4.2.Sponsoring  
 
Probably, even though it is not clear, before moving the debate to New York, the MMSS 
must decide which draft proposals they are going to sponsor. This part of the study will focus 
on the analysis of the different drafts sponsored and which are the ones promoted by the EEMM 
and their continuity. Is important to do this investigation, because this will be interesting to 
compare the sponsorships with the EU Statements and with the vote results.  
 
Moreover, the number of policies and their theme will show the main interest of the EU. 
Also, it is important to recall the fact that the European Union and its MMSS do not back drafts 
on its own. There are probably will to be more countries sponsoring the proposals that are not 
going to be analysed because they are not the Member States.  
 
In the annexe, there are the tables showing the different supported drafts. It is clear 
when looking at tables 9 to 19 that the States who tend to sponsor more policies are Austria and 
Ireland. Also, Poland, Italy and Sweden, as well as the Austria and Ireland are the States who 
tend to promote more policies alone, or at least without any other MMSS.  
Looking at those tables it can be seen that the nations do not always furtherance the 
same draft in all the Sessions. There might be changes that can be justified or not. There are 
years where Greece has not backed any policy as in 2012 or Malta in 2012 and 2013. So, it does 
not appear as there is any strong time pattern in sponsoring a proposal. It seems like it depends 
on the countries interest that year or in the modifications done to the text. 
 
In the footnotes of tables 9 to 19 are the names of the draft's the L. code refers to. In 
grey, there are highlighted the policies that reached the sponsorship of all the MMSS that it is 
the same as saying that it acquired the EU sponsoring. In the following table, there is a 
compilation of the different drafts all the EU States have supported. 
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TABLE 1 
 
2008 The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation 
Transparency in armaments 
2009 Transparency in armaments 
2010  Consolidation of peace through practical disarmament measures 
2011 Transparency in armaments 
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban  
Compliance with non-proliferation 
2014 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
2015 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
2018 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
The Arms Trade Treaty 
 
Source: own construction  
 
 
4.3. New York meetings: looking for the homogenisation  
 
 “Interviewed 1” who works on the Spanish Representation to the United Nations in 
New York explained the functioning of the process in NY. The information they gave is 
completed by the explanation given by “interviewed 3” from the Brussels perspective.  
 
Once in NY, the work is centred at the EU delegation at the United Nations. There is 
where all the work is prepared. As has already been mentioned, the EU is not a member of the 
United Nation. Therefore, it acts through their member states. These speeches can be general 
statements on a proposal, vote explanations or intention of the vote as well as the opening 
speech at the General Assembly.  
  
There the meetings are daily. The Delegation and its workers focus on trying to 
homogenise the different positions – a term used by some of the interviewed. Diplomats 
exposed that the EU Delegation has a secondary objective that is the promotion of the 
information-sharing between the Member States. Figure 5 shows the New York process. It is 
not clear when they do the meetings, but it is believed that the coordination meetings take place 
during the discussion of the proposals. As mentioned by "interviewed 3", these meetings in NY 
is daily. That is why the EU speech in the opening Assembly and the meetings are parallel in 
the figure. 
FIGURE 5 
 
 
Source: own construction  
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There are meetings at the EU Delegations where the different Ambassadors who 
oversee the C.1 participate and try to reach understandings in different topics or at less share 
their opinions on the various proposals. As was mentioned in the literature analysis and 
observed for many scholars, there are never general agreements between all the members and 
in all the topics. There are the ministerial meetings, where the Foreign Affairs ministers reunite 
with the High Representative. They can reunite with non-EU Foreign Ministers to tackle 
important topics that are discussed at the UNGA. 
 
 Whenever there is a strong agreement, the EU Delegation publishes a statement and 
reads it at the Assembly. These documents explain the main reasons why the EU decided its 
vote. However, many of the EU Statements are from policies that end up not being voted at the 
General Assembly. Most of the statements are approved beforehand at the C.1 meetings.  This 
vote explanation can be released before or after the vote. Therefore, they will be analysed 
afterwards.  
 
It is interesting to perceive that in some of these statements, other States also participate. 
“Interviewed 1” explained that once the EU Members State decided to publish a Statement, it 
is first sent to third countries who may also be interested in the Statement and they can join. 
Once the countries have answered if they want to be part of the Statement, it is read at the 
UNGA and published. 
 
These last two paragraphs are the introduction of the 4.6. Yet, this is the process where 
the EoV and the different statements released by the EU Delegation start. And in these meetings 
also lead to the communication whit third states, have been presented in this point. 
 
4.4. EU opening speech, exposing the priorities 
 
The EU makes a Statement at the First Assembly opening. There they expose the 
different main points the EU has for the First Committee drafts and proposals. The EU also has 
an opening speech in the opening of the UNGA, that sets the general ideas and goals for all the 
six committees and the other statements voted at the plenary. In the annexe, in Table 20, there 
are all the topics mentioned in each of the opening speeches.  
 
Some issues are mentioned in multiple discourses. Table 2 shows these topics to make 
it more visual the identification of the most important areas for the EU in the 2008 to 2018 
period. The 2011 Statement was not found; therefore, this year’s opening speech is not analysed 
in the paper.  
 
Different people have read these discourses over the years. Before the EU was an 
observer with speaking rights, the Ambassadors of the countries holding the Presidency of the 
European Commission were the readers. Since 2011 it is the person in charge of the EU 
Delegation in New York, a member of the EEAS, who has this privilege.   
 
In Table 2 are the most important topics with the years mentioned explained. In the list 
below, there are the topics that have been mentioned in at least four discourses are:   
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• Chemical Weapons 
• Multilateralism 
• Non-Proliferation Treaty 
• Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
• North Korea 
• Iran 
• Outer space activities 
• Arms Trade Treaty 
• Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action  
• Terrorism 
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TABLE 2 
 
 
Source: own construction  
 2008 2009 2010 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Effective multilateral system X X X X X   X X   x 
strategy against the proliferation of mass destruction 
weapons X     X X           
NPT X   X X X   X X X x 
Iranian Nuclear program X   X   X           
Denuclearisation of North Korea X   X   X X X X X   
Syria X       X X X X   X 
Fissile material (FMCT) X X   X X         X 
Post-START (US and Russia) X     X         X X 
Treaty banning the short and medium-range missiles X                   
Biological Weapons X   X               
Chemical Weapons Convention X     X X X X   X X 
SALW X X X X             
Fight against Terrorism X       X     X   X 
Hague Code of Conduct X X X         X X   
Outer space X   X X X X X X     
Universalization of the treaties  X                   
Human consequences of cluster munitions  X                   
Anti-personnel mines X   X               
Illicit trade in ammunition  X             X     
Transparency  X X       X         
Peaceful uses of nuclear energy    X X X   X         
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty   X X X X X X   X X 
Regional security                     
BTWC     X X X     X   X 
Arms Trade Treaty     X X X X X X X X 
Conference on disarmament     X   X           
Convention on cluster munitions     X X       X     
Middle East       X X   X     X 
Ukraine           X         
Fact Finding Mission           X X     X 
Humanitarian, socio-economic and security impact of 
conventional weapons and its use           X         
Empowerment of women             X       
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action                X X X 
Nuclear and radiological security               X     
Certain Conventional Weapons Convention                X     
Responsible state behaviour in cyberspace               X     
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty                 X X 
Improving and strengthening stability in cyber space                   X 
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4.5.Voting  
 
After the Assembly has opened the voting starts. In the General Assembly, the 
representants vote the drafts and proposals that the First Committee – who prepares the 
drafts and the proposals- has discussed. So, it can be affirmed that at the UNGA, the 
States vote the work previously done by the C.1. Figure 6 graphically shows it. 
 
 
FIGURE 6 
 
 
Source: Own Construction  
 
The First Committee as a working Committee also votes the work they have 
done. After, States can explain their choices. They can do as many statements as they 
want. The EU usually makes some. However, the process on the C.1 is quite occult. 
Because of this, the analysis does not follow the votes and the work done there. If the 
policy is approved without a vote, the draft proposal is normally also passed to the 
General Assembly. There are seasons who only study the drafts related to the First 
Committee work, that is what we have referred to as the C.1. 
 
Therefore, it will be done to analyse the voting records of the General Assembly 
on the First Committee. The following table exposes the % of unanimity from the voting 
records. In the unanimity are just considered the policies which vote was recorded, not 
the ones passed by consensus. In the Assembly, proposals can be voted separated, some 
articles and the whole proposal. In those cases, separated votes are also considered. 
 
 In the analysis the proposals passed without a vote are not included. 
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TABLE 3 
 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 201254 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
% 67,5% 63% 60% 74% 38% 71% 58,3% 46,3% 65,6% 44,4% 44,2% 
 
Source: Own Construction  
 
2011 is the year with the highest coordination with 74%. Contrary, 2012 has the 
lowest.  This can be explained with Bulgaria and the UK missing some votes, the missing 
votes were not considered. Contrary, the votes that were not submitted but the State 
informed the Secretary have been accounted. 
 
There will be more focus on trying to understand the decrease of unanimity 
shown in the table. It started in 2014 when it declined from 71% to 46,3% and in 2017 
when the reduction also represents a 20% from 65,6% in 2016 to 44,4%.  
 
Furthermore, Table 4 exhibits the countries that voted the same in all the 
proposals. As explained in the methodology, this is an important analysis to understand 
if there are countries that act together following the EU’s voice or if they behave as 
MMSS or to identify those States who can follow other interest when voting. The Table 
tells that in 2009, 15 countries voted the same. In 2008, there was a group of 9 and in 
2013, there were 6. However, since 2013 this pattern seems to decrease. In 2018, there 
were no coincidences. One of the hypotheses followed the idea that since the Lisbon 
Treaty, there was a stronger EU voice on International Security issues. The Treaty was 
established in 2010 and, as seen in the table, that is when the groups started to diminish. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
54 UK and Bulgaria where not present in some votes and they did not inform the Secretary of their voting 
will. Therefore, the results shown in the table represent the unanimity without considering these 2 
countries position when there were not there, 14 of 37. If considering all the 27 States to vote 
unanimously, the result is 10 of 37 and the 27%.  
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TABLE 4 
 
Source: own construction  
 
When asked, “interviewed 1” exposed that coordination is was a casualty. There 
is no well-defined coordination between the states to act as a block. "Interviewed 1" 
exposed that this can respond to different reasons. These reasons are the principal interests 
and characteristics of every State's foreign policy. As European countries, they all share 
similar opinions and views in some of the proposals and they may share the same threats 
and dangers. Therefore, it can be affirmed that these are a casualty. "Interviewed 1" 
claimed that the EU countries single common characteristic was being a European Union 
member. 
 
In Table 5, there is the table with the MMSS code replacing the numbers. There, 
it is obvious that many countries can have a lot of similarities or who try to coordinate. 
HR is in red crosses from 2008-2012 because these years it was not a MMSS. Anyway, 
the counties which seem to follow a pattern are first of all France and the United 
Kingdom. These countries do not have the same voting trim as any of the other States. 
They are also the ones who tend to follow less the voting model exposed by the EU. 
 
The neutral states – Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland and Sweden- tend to act 
together. Contrary, the NATO Members also lead to common positions.  “Interviewed 1” 
revealed that being a NATO State or not, is just another characteristic that helps the 
country construct their opinion. Hence, this is not the only characteristic that builds the 
argumentation for the voting results.  
 
Moreover, other states who seem more united are Latvia and Estonia, 
Luxembourg and Belgium.  Sometimes Slovenia, Denmark and Slovakia join. Looking 
at the table, there are no other countries that appear to follow the pattern. 
 
What also catches the eye is the construction of this big groups that are 
constituted by 9 or 15 states in the years before the Lisbon Treaty and, how after it the 
groups decreased. 2 exceptions are 2011 and 2014 with groups with more than 6 MMSS.  
  AT  BE  BG HR CY CZ DK EE FI FR DE  EL HU  IE IT LV LT LU MT NL PL PT RO SK SI ES SE  UK 
2008 0 3 9 0 0 9 2 9 0 0 2 9 9 0 2 0 2 9 0 0 9 3 0 9 9 3 0 0 
2009 3 15 15 0 3 15 0 15 3 0 15 15 15 0 15 15 2 15 3 15 2 15 3 15 15 15 3 0 
2010 0 3 3 0 0 3 3 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 0 3 3 3 2 2 2 3 0 0 3 2 0 0 
2011 4 6 6 0 2 8 6 8 2 0 2 8 8 4 2 8 8 6 4 2 8 6 0 6 2 8 4 0 
2012 3 3 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 3 0 4 4 3 3 0 0 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 
2013 0 2 2 2 0 4 6 4 2 0 6 3 4 2 0 4 6 2 2 6 6 3 0 6 2 3 0 0 
2014 0 0 2 0 2 0 2 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 0 2 2 0 2 0 
2015 0 2 0 0 0 2 2 2 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 
2016 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 3 0 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 
2017 0 0 2 4 0 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 4 4 4 0 0 
2018 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Table 6 reveals that the Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary and Spain are the 
states who tend to be part of the larger groups and who participate in this coalitions for a 
more prolonged period. 
 
As an outline, the Table proves that the years where there is a higher % of 
unanimity there is also a bigger group on the voting results. Therefore, it can be affirmed 
that when there are fewer differences between the States, the unanimity increases. As a 
reflex, in 2011, the consensus reached its highest point marking 74% and, that was the 
year where more countries took part in an association. There were a group of 8, one of 6, 
one of 4 and there were 3 groups of 2.  However, in 2009 there was the largest group with 
15 MMSS. Contrary, in 2012, the voting gatherings reduced to small minimums having 
16 states following no pattern. That was also the year whit a lower %.  In 2018 % and the 
grouping decreased more.  It must be said that this correlation between the voting 
grouping and unanimity is not perfect. 2016, is an example of this imperfection with 65% 
of unanimity but with fewer and smaller groups. 
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TABLE 5 
 
 
Source: own construction  
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4.6.Explanation of vote  
 
As it has been explained before, these statements tend to be created before 
voting. The EU ones tend to be prepared in the EU Meetings with all the MMSS 
Ambassadors and send to the Third States to see if they want to joint. Commonly the 
States who are enlargement candidates tend to align with the EU.  
 
Through these documents, Nations have the opportunity to speak up about the 
motivation of their vote. These are called the explanation of vote (EoV). This data is 
important for the study to see the policies on which there are EoV and the groups in which 
they deliver them. The European Union tends to read and release them before the vote is 
processed. In them, they justify what they intend to do and why. Contrary, the MMSS 
share them after the vote. This is why these documents analysis follows the vote 
observation. Table 6 shows the EoV and their result. In red, there are the EoV that explain 
the vote against the draft. In yellow the ones that justify the abstention and in green the 
ones who motivate the vote in favour. 
 
The Table shows that some countries publish more Statements than others. The 
ones who use more this instrument are the United Kingdom, France and Sweden. 
Nevertheless, some countries do not deliver any. Some webs have this information 
codified and, they know how many EoVs were released and who produced them. On 
constructing this paper these databases have been used as a guide. But not all the 
Statements are public anymore. It seems like overtime, States stopped publishing the 
EoV, they just read them on the UNGA. In the annexe, there is Table 21 that shows the 
missing EoV. Those EoVs opinions can be deduced by the voting report. However, by 
not looking at their content there is information ignored as if it speaks for other MMSS 
or not. 
 
Looking at Table 6, there can be identified as multiple *. This represents the 
common Statements of the United Kingdom, France and the United States. There are 
many drafts on which they act together. Even in some, they refer to themselves as Security 
Council members. However, this is not the only characteristic they share. They are NATO 
founders and Nuclear States. In 2015, the 5 permanent members of the Security Council 
released an EoV on L.13 this is market in the table with a **. 
 
The L.19 in 2012 has the code AUS+, referring to Australia and others. This is 
because Australia read the EoV in the name of several EU Member States. These States 
were: Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden. 
 
Following the same logic, in 2014’s L.63 the United States statement talked in 
behalf of Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Finland, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Malta, Netherlands, 
Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland – 21 MMSS-.  
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Sweden’s EoVs are joint with Switzerland since 2015. Austria’s EoV tends to share 
the position of Ireland (69/L.16), but also the one of Malta (68/L.6) and Sweden (65/L.10) 
(69/L.44).  This means that the Neutral countries usually share the same argumentation and the 
same voting  
 
On Table 7, there are displayed the different EoV where an EU MMSS spoke in the 
name of other MMSS. In the Table, there are just exposed the MMSS, but they might be other 
non-MMSS who also shared the Statements. The red cross represents the State that submitted 
the EoV. The codes are established through the draft coding. This is why before the L. code 
there are the Session numbers. The 65 refers to 2010; the 67 to 2012; the 68 to 2013; the 69 to 
2014; the 70 to 2015; the 71 to 2016, the 72 to 2017 and finally the 73 to the 2018 Session. 
 
TABLE 7 
 
 
Source: own construction  
 
In the Table, it can be seen that France and the United Kingdom did not share any EoV 
with the rest of the MMSS aside from the EU ones and the EoV submitted by the United States. 
Sweden stopped sharing Statements with the rest of the EU MMSS in 2015, that is when it 
started delivering them with Switzerland. The EoV released by Switzerland were not analysed, 
so there might be more documents were these two countries spoke together. However, it is 
interesting that Switzerland and Sweden tend to publish the Statement in the name of the two 
countries, so they talk unitedly and not in the name of the other. 
 
Further, the Table shows that there are many EoV where most States take part in. 
Austria, Ireland, Malta and Sweden tend to not be part of those because they habitually make 
them together. Cyprus and Finland are the nations that integrate on less jointly EoV, they 
participate in different combinations, but there is no explicit model. Finally, Bulgaria, Greece, 
Portugal and Spain seem to have a lot of nexus being fixed members in their EoV. Apart from 
  AT  BE  BG CH CY CZ DK EE FI FR DE  EL HU  IE IT LV LT LU MT NL PL PT RO SK SI ES SE  UK 
65/L.10 X             X     X        X  
65/L.35       X    X         X X      X  
67/L.19 X X X X X X X X X  X X X  X X X X  X X X X X X X X  
67/L.49        X   X       X  X  X   X  X  
68/L.6  X                  X         
68/L.6 X             X     X          
68/L.6   X  X       X          X X  X X   
69/L.12  X  X  X X X X  X  X  X X X X  X X   X   X  
69/L.16 X             X               
69/L.44  X  X  X X X   X  X  X X X X  X X   X     
69/L.44 X             X     X        X  
69/L.44   X  X    X   X          X X   X   
70/L.37  X X X  X X X   X X X  X X X X  X X X X X X X   
70/L.38  X X X  X X X   X X X  X X X X  X X X X X X X   
70/L.40  X X X  X X X   X X X  X X X X  X X X X X X X   
71/L.41  X X   X X X   X X X  X X X X   X X X X X X   
72/L.41        X X   X         X   X     
73/L.14   X         X          X    X   
73/L.14  X  X  X X X     X  X X X X  X X  X X X    
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the mentioned groups, it does not resemble that there is any solid or apparent pattern that 
reproduces. 
 
Besides, it is also interesting to see that those EoV are usually presented by the same 
states. The ones who read the Statements in the name of other MMSS more frequently are 
Austria, Germany, The Netherlands, Poland and Spain. Moreover, in the 70th Session, 
Germany's Statements spoke in the name of the same 19 other MMSS. 
To conclude, even if it is not going to be taken into account afterwards, the Third States 
who tend to be more present in those EoV released by MMSS are Albania, Australia, Canada, 
Iceland, Montenegro, Turkey, Liechtenstein and Japan.  
 
4.7.Data analysis  
 
Nonetheless, this analysed data needs to be put in its context. That is why a historical 
analysis of the different procedures will be realized. By historical analysis, it is mean the 
comparison of the different areas to understand if there are more coordination and similarities 
between the states than what did “Interviewed 1” said.   
 
In Table 8, different policies had the vote recorded. The red represents that in that year, 
the EU Member States had voted unanimously in the proposal. In grey are highlighted those 
drafts that received an EoV that Session, the ones that were sponsored by some MMSS or that 
that policy was mentioned in the Session opening speech. In the first line, there is the year and 
in the second one, the code.  If a proposal does not have red or grey in any of the 10 periods, 
this is not analysed. These proposals are: 
 
• Fourth Conference of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Mongolia, 2020 
• Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace 
• Universal Declaration on the Achievement of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free-World 
 
In this analysis, the only results that have been used are the votes of the draft as a whole. 
The proposals that do not have grey or red are not going to be considered. The unanimity is 
exposed in the annexe – tables 22 to 32-, the EoV in tables 6 and 7 and the sponsoring in table 
1 and tables 9 to 19 of the annexe.   
 
The different proposals will be considered depending on their vote results through the 
years. First, there is going to be the proposals that have never reached unanimity, after the ones 
who have experienced changes and finally the ones who have received full support, full 
abstention or full negativity from the MMSS. 
 
If a proposal acquires an important amount of EoVs, sponsors or/and it has been 
mentioned multiple times through the years, this data is going to be presented in bullet points 
to make the comprehension of the proposal analysis easier to understand. Said bullet points can 
be constructed following a yearly explanation, following the action of the different States or 
following the different documents' logic. This would be done by separating the EoV data from 
the sponsoring and the opening speeches. If the draft has not had much activity or it has just 
been voted on one or two years, the consideration will be made on a solo text. 
 
CEI, Centro Adscrito a la Universitat de Barcelona                                 Nº 3/2020, 2 DE SEPTIEMBRE DE 2020 
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 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
A/C.1/ 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 
2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and its Preparatory Committee 
   L.15        
2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and its Preparatory Committee 
       L.4/ 
Rev1 
   
Compliance with non-proliferation, arms limitation and 
disarmament agreements and commitments 
L.32/R
ev1 
  L.47/R
ev1 
  L.45   L.7  
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty L.55 
L.47/R
ev1 
L.48 L.37 L.43 
L.29/R
ev1 
L.56 L.46 L.28 L.42 L.26 
Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non 
nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear 
weapons 
L.7 L.24 L.5 L.25 L.52 L.49 L.27 L.32 L.13 
L.10/R
ev1 
L.4 
Consolidation of peace through practical disarmament measures L.36  L.36        L.35 
Convening of the fourth special session of the General Assembly 
devoted to disarmament 
  L.35       L.33 L.16 
Convention on Cluster Munitions        
L.49/R
ev1 
L.22 L.41 L.39 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons L.15 L.20 L.26 L.46 L.25 L.21 L.16 L.21 L.10 L.47 L.44 
Conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels L.9 L.29 L.6 L.27 L.53 L.52 L.30 L.34 L.16 
L.13/R
ev1 
L.6 
Decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems L.5  L.42  L.28  L.22  L.33  L.52 
Developments in the field of information and telecommunications 
in the context of international security 
L.45        L.17 L.44 
L.27/R
ev1 
Effects of the use of armaments and ammunitions containing 
depleted uranium 
L.26  L.19  L.16  L.43  L.63  L.12 
Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia L.37  L.10  
L.4/ 
Rev1 
      
Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the 
Middle East 
 L.3         L.1 
Ethical imperatives for a nuclear-weapon-free world        L.40 L.36 L.17 L.62 
Follow-up to nuclear disarmament obligations agreed to at the 1995 
and 2000 Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty on the 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
 L.6  L.3  L.11  L.23  
L.45/R
ev1 
 
Follow-up to the 2013 high-level meeting of the General Assembly 
on nuclear disarmament 
     L.6/ 
Rev1 
L.44 L.15 L.64  L.14 
Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of 
Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons 
L.19 L.51 L.50 L.42 L.9 L.26 L.23 L.51 L.42 L.57 
L.57/R
ev1 
Fourth Conference of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Mongolia, 
2020 
          L.66 
Further practical measures for the prevention of an arms race in 
outer space 
          L.54 
High-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear 
disarmament 
    L.19       
Humanitarian Consequences of Nuclear Weapons        L.37 L.23 L.5 L.23 
Humanitarian pledge for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear 
weapons 
       L.38 L.24   
Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical 
Weapons and on Their Destruction 
      L.63 
L.27/R
ev1 
L.61/R
ev1 
L.26/R
ev1 
L.20 
Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, 
Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and 
on their Destruction 
L.6 L.53 L.8 L.4 L.8 L.3 
L.5/ 
Rev1 
L.50 
L.7/ 
Rev1 
L.40 
L.53/R
ev1 
Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of 
Peace 
 L.6  L.5  L.13  L.18  L.29  
Measures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol L.25  L.12  L.15  L.38  L.43  L.17 
Missiles L.27          L.10 
TABLE 8 
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Source: own construction  
 
 
4.7.1 No unanimity  
 
Convening the 4th special session on disarmament in 2010 had strongly opposite 
opinions. France, UK and US voted against and Italy and Denmark – who spoke on behalf of 
Germany, the Netherlands, Poland and Sweden- supported the session.   
 
National legislation on transfer of arms, military equipment and 
dual-use goods and technology 
     L.31   L.58   
No first placement of weapons in outer space       L.14 L.47 L.18 L.53 L.51 
Nuclear disarmament L.14 L.48 L.22 L.49  L.36 
L.31/R
ev1 
L.44 L.47 L.18 L.28 
Nuclear disarmament verification         
L.57/R
ev1 
 L.31 
Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas L.40 L.31 L.24  L.45  L.10 L.35 L.31 L.28  
Observance of environmental norms in the drafting and 
implementation of agreements on disarmament and arms control 
       L.7    
Preventing and combating illicit brokering activities  L.49 
L.49/R
ev1 
 L.24  L.48  L.9  L.55 
Prevention of an arms race in outer space L.4 L.25 L.2 L.14 L.3 L.41 
L.3/Re
v1 
L.3 L.3 L.3 L.3 
Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of 
weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons 
L.12   L.24   L.7   L.9  
Promotion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament and non-
proliferation 
L.20 L.13 L.15 L.8 L.18 L.17 L.39  L.45 L.32 L.15 
Reducing nuclear danger L.16 L.18 L.27 L.45 L.27 L.20 L.18 L.20 L.11 L.22 L.43 
Renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear 
weapons 
L.58 L.36          
Strengthening of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean 
region 
          L.30 
Taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations     L.46 L.34 L.21 
L.13/R
ev1 
L.41 L.6  
The Arms Trade Treaty  
L.38/R
ev1 
 L.50  L.4 
L.32/R
ev1 
L.54 L.29 L.27 
L.8/Re
v1 
The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation L.38  L.45  L.23  L.25  L.5  L.25 
The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects L.57 
L.42/R
ev.1 
        L.63 
The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East L.2 L.4 L.3 L.2 L.2 L.2 
L.2/ 
Rev1 
L.2 
L.2/ 
Rev1 
L.2 L.2 
Third Conference of States Parties and Signatories to Treaties that 
Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Mongolia, 2015 
      L.57     
Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the 
implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments 
L.30 L.54 L.25 
L.31/R
ev1 
L.13 L.18 
L.12/R
ev1 
L.41/R
ev1 
L.35 L.19 L.64 
Transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space 
activities 
L.44/R
ev1 
 L.38        
L.68/R
ev1 
Transparency in armaments L.51 L.50  L.29 L.22 L.30   L.21   
Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear 
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices 
  L.33 
L.40/R
ev1 
L.41   L.25  L.50 L.58 
Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons           L.24 
Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone 
(Bangkok Treaty) 
 L.23          
United action towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons   L.43 L.41 L.49 L.43 L.36 L.26 L.26 L.35 L.54 
Universal Declaration on the Achievement of a Nuclear-Weapon-
Free-World 
       L.52/R
ev1 
  L.46 
Women, disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control       L.47     
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Decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapons system is voted every 2 years. 
An EoV explaining the vote against of France, UK and the US was released in 2008, 2010, 
2012 and 2014.  
 
• In 2008, Belgium exposed its EoV in favour and Lithuania its abstention. And in 2016, 
Austria, Ireland and Sweden sponsored it  
• In 2018, Austria, Belgium, Finland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta and Sweden supported 
it.  
 
The Effects of the use of armaments and ammunitions containing depleted uranium is 
another controversial topic between the MMSS.  
 
• UK, France and the US have explained its negative vote in 2008, 2012 and 2014.  
• In 2010, Austria, Germany and Belgium exposed its reasons to vote in favour. - 
Germany also did one in favour in 2014 and 2016 it did one for its abstention.  
• In 2016, the EoV in support were from Netherlands and Sweden, who repeated in 2018. 
 
The Ethical imperatives for a nuclear-weapon-free world 
 
• Was sponsored by Austria and Ireland in 2015 when the UK, France and US in one hand 
and Germany in the other, read their statements on why they voted against and Sweden 
read its EoV on its abstention.  Germany spoke in the name of all the EU MMSS except 
from the Austria, Ireland, UK, France, Sweden and Malta.  
• In 2016, 2017 and 2018 the sponsors also were Austria and Ireland.  
• In 2017 and 2018 the UK with France and the US also explained why they voted against. 
 
The Follow-up to the 2013 high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear 
disarmament,  
 
• In the 2013 EoV showed all the possible views. 
o France, UK and the US voted against as well as the Netherlands- in name of 
Belgium-  
o Ireland- also sharing the view of Austria and Malta- voted in favour  
o Spain – speaking in name of Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece, Portugal, Romania and 
Slovenia- abstained.  
• In 2015, the UK with its group and the Netherlands also exposed in the EoV the motives 
for their negative vote as well as in 2018- Netherlands spoke in the name of 14 MMSS 
(73/L.14).  
• In 2018, Bulgaria spoke in name of Greece, Portugal and Spain to justify their 
abstention. 
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The follow-up on the International Court of Justice on the legality of nuclear weapons 
has had the EoV of Sweden explaining its vote in favour in 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2014.  
 
The further practical measures for the prevention of an arms race in outer space was 
voted in 2017 and France, released an EoV explaining its vote against it.  
 
The High-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament, was voted 
in 2012 Australia as explained in the EoV explanations was the one reading in the name of 
different MMSS and the UK explained why they abstained. 
 
Humanitarian consequences of Nuclear Weapons, was sponsored by the Neutral 
countries in the four voting reports of the period. Cyprus only furtherance it in 2016. In 2014 it 
was mentioned at the EU opening speech.  
 
The humanitarian pledge for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons was 
sponsored by Austria, Ireland and Malta in 2015.  
 
Nuclear disarmament. In 2011, the Netherlands and Germany exposed the motivations 
after they voted against it. In 2017 Austria and Ireland sponsored the proposal. Only the neutral 
states voted abstention on the proposal. Not all 5 states abstained in all the votes.  
 
The nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas. In 2009, the UK 
released an EoV explaining its negative vote and in 2010 and 2012, 2014, 2016 and 2018 France 
and the US joined the UK on another EoV in the same direction. In 2015, Austria and Ireland 
furtherance the proposal and in 2016, Portugal joined them on the promotion.  
 
The Promotion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation is 
one of the most repeated topics on the opening speeches of the EU. All states voted in favour 
of it in the 9 voting records with the exception of the UK who has never released an EoV 
explaining why it has always abstained.  
 
A related proposal, Taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations, 
had diverse approaches.  
 
• In 2012, the UK with the US and France realised a statement exposing their vote against.  
• In 2013, it was sponsored by Austria, Denmark, Ireland and Netherlands and 2015,2016 
and in 2017 it was sponsored by Austria, Ireland and Malta.  
• The UK presented one on its vote against jointly with France and the US in 2013 and 
2014 by France. The three states also submitted one in 2015.  
• In 2015, Cyprus explained in an EoV its abstention and.   
• In 2016, Sweden exposed an EoV in favour of the proposal and the Netherlands did one 
on its abstention and Poland-spoke on behalf of 14 MMSS (71/L.41) 
• In 2016, the UK, France and the US did an EoV explaining their vote against and 
Sweden did one describing its vote in favour of the proposal. 
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The Third Conference of States Parties and Signatories to Treaties that Establish 
Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Mongolia, 2015 received an EoV of France, UK and the 
United States on their abstention.  
 
The Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (Bangkok Treaty) was 
voted in 2009 and the UK on its own released and statement explaining why they voted in 
favour. 
 
The proposal Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation 
of nuclear disarmament commitments also had a diverse approach through the years.  
 
• In 2008 was sponsored by Sweden.  In 2009, 2010 and 2011 it was joined by Ireland.  
• In 2012, 2013, 2014 and 2015 Ireland supported it alone.  
• In 2016, and 2018 it was supported by Austria and Ireland.  
• Regarding the EoV, in 2010, the UK release one on its abstention.   
• In 2012 it was the UK and France separately who released them. That same year, the 
Netherlands exposed favourable vote.   
• Finally, 2013, 2014 and 2015 UK, France and the US released one on their negative 
vote. 
The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons was just voted in 2018 when it got 
the support of Austria and Ireland. That year the UK, France and the US exposed the motives 
after their negative vote.  
 
 
4.7.2 Changes on unanimity  
 
The Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East was 
voted twice. Even though it was not mentioned in any document, it obtained unanimity in its 
first voting in 2009. However, the second time it was voted in 2018 it did not reach unanimity 
because the UK voted against.  
 
The Follow-up to nuclear disarmament obligations agreed to at the 1995 and 2000 
Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. 
This reached unanimity in 2009, 2011 and 2013. In 2011, the EU exposed why they voted 
against. That is interesting due to the importance of the TNP for the EU. In 2015, the only 
MMSS that did not vote against was Italy who abstained.  In 2017, Austria, Finland and Italy 
abstained while the others voted against. 
 
No first placement of weapons in outer space was voted between 2014 and 2018. It 
reached unanimity in the first 4 votes but in 2018, some states voted against. In 2014, 2015 and 
2017 the EU released a Statement on the abstention. In 2018, they exposed that the EU could 
not support the motion.  
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The Missiles draft in 2018 reached it in favour. However, in 2008 France explained its 
vote against it while most of the other states abstained or voted against.  
 
In the renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons vote in 
2008 was unanimous in support but in 2009 France abstained. 
• In 2008 it was sponsored by Austria, Czech Republic, Finland, Germany and 
Luxembourg  
• In 2009, by 14 MMSS.   
• Both years, France released an EoV, in 2008 explaining why it voted in favour and in 
2009 justifying their abstention. 
 
The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East is suggested in the literature to be 
one of the topics in where the EU has a single voice. The 2012, 2013 and 2015 opening speeches 
mentioned the region. There was unanimity from 2008 to 2013. Those years the EU exposed 
an EoV explaining its vote in favour of the proposal (2008, 2010 and 2013).  
 
• In 2014, some States started abstaining – Belgium, Czech Republic, France, Denmark, 
Hungary, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland and the United Kingdom, and, they 
continued doing so.  
• In 2015, Luxembourg also started abstaining.  
• In 2016, Denmark, Italy and Romania also abstained.  
• Therefore, in 2018 just 15 MMSS voted in favour of the proposal.  
 
United action towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons was voted from 2010 
to 2018. It got unanimity in favour till 2014 when some States started abstaining.  
 
• In 2010 it was sponsored by 21 MMSS and in 2009 by 22.   
• In 2012, 20 states were encouraging it and France submitted an EoV explaining its 
positive vote.  
• In 2013, France made a similar EoV on the same objective and the proposal was 
sponsored by 12 MMSS.  
• In 2014, France repeated the EoV and 24 States supported the proposal.  
• In 2015, 21 States supported the proposal. This year the EoV was released by France 
explaining the abstention.  
• In 2016, the states that did not furtherance were Cyprus, Greece and the United 
Kingdom.  
• In 2017, the EoV of France showed the negative vote and the Sweden one its positive 
vote. The sponsors that year were 16 MMSS.  
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COLECCIÓN TRABAJOS DE INVESTIGACIÓN DEL 
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• Finally, in 2018 the EoV of Sweden also showed its support on the proposal and France 
exposed its abstention. The sponsoring that year consisted of 17 states. 
 
4.7.3 Unanimity  
 
The 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons and its Preparatory Committee and the 2020 Review Conference of the 
Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and its Preparatory 
Committee are related to the NPT which has been mentioned in almost every opening speech 
in the period (2009 and 2014 where the only speeches who did not mention the NPT).  
 
The consolidation of peace through practical disarmament measures in 2008, all the 
states except for Malta sponsored it and in 2010 all the MMSS supported it. in 2018 the only 
one who did not join the sponsoring was Poland.  
 
Compliance with non-proliferation, arms limitation and disarmament agreements and 
commitments is voted every 3 years. In 2008, it was mentioned in the opening speech. In 2014, 
the draft proposal sponsors were all MMSS except for Austria and Belgium. And in 2011, was 
an EU sponsored policy. 
 
The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is probably one of the most important 
topics for the EU. This has been mentioned in different opening speeches and multiple states 
have been supporting the policy in the period -2009, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015 and 2018. It was 
supported by many States through the years, at least 14 MMSS every year till 2018 when it got 
the support of all the EU MMSS.  
 
The Convention on cluster munition has been mentioned in many opening speeches. 
Nonetheless, the UNGA did not vote it till 2014. In 2016, it reached unanimity and in 2017 and 
2018, almost half of the MMSS sponsored it.  
 
The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear weapons had a negative 
unanimity, all the EU states voted against the draft in the 10 voting records. In 2014, Austria 
released an EoV explaining its negative vote.  
 
The conventional arms control on the regional and subregional level was supported 
by Italy in 2011, 2013, 2014, 2015 and in 2018. The regional security was also mentioned in 
the 2016 speech.  
 
The Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context 
of international security in 2018, got an EoV of the EU explaining the change from the in favour 
of the previous voting periods to the negative vote that they submitted in that year. 
 
The Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 
Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction was a 
proposal mentioned in different opening speeches – 2008, 2010- and in 2016 it was sponsored 
by Austria and Belgium. In 2017 it had Austria's support and in 2018 Poland's. 
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The National legislation on transfer of arms, military equipment and dual-use goods 
and technology was sponsored by the Netherlands both times it was voted at the UNGA.  
 
On the nuclear disarmament verification. In 2016, was sponsored by Austria, Finland, 
Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom and in 2018, it was sponsored by the Netherlands. 
 
The Prevention of an arms race in outer space was mentioned in the opening speeches 
2008, 2010, 2012 and 2015.  
 
The Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass 
destruction and new systems of such weapons was sponsored by Poland in 2011 and 2014.  
 
The Preventing and combating illicit brokering activities was sponsored by 24 MMSS 
in 2009 and in 2010 all states sponsored it except Greece, Latvia and the United Kingdom. In 
2012, it also had a strong sponsoring by the EU members as well as in 2014, 2016 and 2018 
when only the UK did not sponsor it. 
 
Strengthening the security and cooperation in the Mediterranean regions has been a 
long-time proposal sponsored by different EU states. However, it was not voted in the General 
Assembly till 2018 when it was sponsored by Austria, Cyprus, Estonia, Ireland, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Malta, Netherlands and the United Kingdom. 
 
The Arms Trade Treaty was mentioned in the 2010, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 
2017 and 2018 opening speeches.  
 
• In 2009, 2011, 2013, Finland and the United Kingdom sponsored it.  
• In 2014, all the EU states except from Belgium, Hungary, Malta and Romania promoted 
it.  
• In 2015, Austria, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden supported it.  
• In 2016, all EU states promoted it except for Greece.  
• In 2017, the only who did not urge for its approval were Cyprus, Denmark, Italy and the 
UK.  
• In 2018, all the MMSS furtherance for it.   
 
The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation was mentioned in 
the 2008, 2009, 2010, 2013, 2016 and 2017.  It was a full supported draft in 2008. In 2010 it 
was sponsored by France, Hungary and Sweden. In 2012, 19 States sponsored it. In 2014 the 
only non-sponsoring were Greece and Malta. In 2016 it was Sweden the one who did not 
sponsor while in 2018 it was the UK.  
 
The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects (SALW) is another 
of the policies most supported by the EU.  
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• It was mentioned in the 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2012 opening speeches.  
• In 2008, 2009 and 2018 it was sponsored by at least 15EU MMSS.  
 
Transparency in armaments was promoted by different states through the years.  
 
• In 2008, 2009 and 2011 all MMSS  
• In 2012, the Netherlands furtherance  
• in 2013, 21 MMSS did it.  
• In 2016, the only states who did not support it were Belgium, Denmark and Sweden. 
 
The treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other 
nuclear explosive devices was mentioned in the opening discourse of 2008, 2009, 2012, 2013, 
2014 and 2018. In 2017, the Netherlands supported the draft and in 2018 Germany adjoint.   
 
Women, disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control got to the UNGA in 2014. It 
reached unanimity and Austria, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Ireland, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and 
Sweden supported it 
 
Drafts that reached unanimity even though they were never mentioned in any opening 
speech, that never were sponsored and that never where mentioned in an EoV.  
 
• The measures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol always reached 
unanimity.  
• The Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non nuclear-weapon 
States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons  
• Observance of environmental norms in the drafting and implementation of agreements 
on disarmament and arms control 
• Reducing the nuclear danger. 
• Transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space.  
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
Answering the research question - Has the EU act with a single voice in the United 
Nations General Assembly First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) since the 
Lisbon Treaty? - the response is going to be no. The EU has not acted with a single voice. The 
process with which the EU tries to homogenize the different MMSS views has strengthened 
and has incorporated new actors into the game. The EEAS does the hard work to prepare the 
single voice or at least tries to find the biggest amount of areas where the EU can try to find the 
consensus. 
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The different steps studied have different importance. The process is still done in 
Brussels and New York even though this is quite dark. But it has changed due to the new EEAS 
who are currently the ones who set the proposals in the PSC and the ones who prepare the FAC 
meetings. The sponsorships do not matter, seems like the countries do it on their comfort. They 
seem to promote based on arbitrary reasons and a lot of the times the drafts changes over the 
years, do not reflect a variation on the position. However, what is obvious is that furtherance 
the project means voting in favour of it. 
 
The vote is the most important data. The voting unanimity in percentage is the type of 
analysis the scholars had done, and they had always shared the opinion that the Security issues 
had lower consensus. This continues to be true. While the other committees lead to having more 
than 80% of common votes, the C.1 highest percentage in the period is 74% while the lowest 
is 38%. Sometimes the MMSS voted the same in all the different votes in a UNGA session, 
though the similarities seem to be a small pattern.  
 
The groups of MMSS voting the same correlates with the unanimity. When there is a 
higher unanimity percentage, there are more groups. Some of the groups are more temporary 
than others. Three groups seem to be more stable. These are: 
 
• Neutral States: they tend to follow their path and tend to homogenise their opinions and 
statements with the United States and the other Security Council Members.  
• Nuclear States: they follow a more joint path between themselves even though they also 
act unilaterally in many proposals. What they usually do is go versus what resembles 
NATO’s action. They tend to vote differently in many projects. Normally, in the EoV, 
they prove their willingness to be a helpful actor whereas, the nuclear states never 
expose this wish. 
• Southern States (Greece, Portugal and Spain): They seem to have some similarities. This 
connection is not as explicit as the other groups. But there might be a very interesting 
gap to study in future studies. 
The EoV, in general, served to reaffirm the voting data and to justify or understand the 
voting groups. These groups were more or less coordinated depending on the statements. As 
seen, there are many statements released by one State speaking on behalf of others (who can or 
can’t be MMSS). There were not many statements where the countries were only MMSS. 
Normally candidate countries align themselves to MMSS. Additionally, the fact that many 
EoVs are not public difficult the study of the grouping. However, as "interviewed 1" said, the 
group patterns formed in the data analysis are a casualty. Without further evidence, this cannot 
be firmly affirmed. A good way to find the proof is finding the missing Statements and analyse 
them. The negative voting or the abstention in some areas did not present reject. Some showed 
discomfort on the changes or expressed that there was more work needed in the area. Also, 
some of the proposals have different content than what expected in the title. This is why the 
vote cannot be judged by the title because some might be misguiding.  
 
Lastly, the Middle East approach needs an individual conclusion. Literature exposed 
that this was the only security topic where there was a single voice constructed. However, data 
showed that this changed since 2014. The proposals regarding the region became very 
heterogenic, essentially the risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. Some countries 
voted against, some in favour and other abstaining. Opposite, the proposals where there is more 
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COLECCIÓN TRABAJOS DE INVESTIGACIÓN DEL 
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understanding upon are related to non-proliferation, to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban 
Treaty, to the arms control, to the chemical weapons and the anti-personnel mine's restriction 
to the Arms Trade Treaty, to the outer space policies, to the nuclear danger and transparency in 
all the aspects of the nuclear restriction and in the international security operations. 
 
Hence, the first hypothesis - the EU Member States have increased their cohesion in 
the First Committee since the Lisbon Treaty came into effect- is false because it did not grow. 
There are few exceptions but, the tendency after 2010 was depreciating the single voice 
produced before the Treaty was effective. 2011 was the year where all the exceptions occurred, 
the unanimity improved to 74% of the votes and 15 States voted unanimously in all the different 
procedures. So, it can be affirmed that at the beginning, it looked like the Lisbon Treaty would 
produce changes yet, it did not last. 
 
The second hypothesis suggested that the single voice is impossible due to the presence 
of Neutral and Nuclear States. It has been claimed through the analysis, that those countries 
acted antagonistically. The other States joined each group depending on the topic. Still, they 
followed the EU when agreed. The UK produced the only discrepancy between the EU's will, 
exposed in the opening speeches, and the results. This difference occurred on the Promotion of 
multilateralism in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation draft in the 10 voting periods 
analysed. Plus, as exposed by "interviewed 3", multilateralism was the 2019 EU's Foreign 
Policy priority. 
 
Finally, the third hypothesis suggested that the OTAN membership had a tremendous 
influence on the voting pattern. "Interviewed 1" exposed that it was just another characteristic 
that did not represent more influence than the others. However, this is false. It appears that it is 
a more important characteristic than others. As seen, all the EU states except the neutrals tend 
to follow the same voting scheme in some areas. All the EU Member States are OTAN members 
except for the Neutral States. Therefore, it seems that this characteristic has an immense 
influence on the votes in the C.1. 
 
As a brief, there is figure 6 showing the different actors and steps that the EU single 
voice process has. Everything starts in Brussels. There, the working groups develop the 
documents and send them to the Coreper II who analyse them. At the same time, the Political 
and Security Committee prepares the Foreign Affairs priorities. Afterwards, the FAC analyses 
the documents and, if needed, they sent it to the European Council. Furthermore, the States and 
the EU settle which drafts they sponsor. Once this process ends, this advances in New York 
even Brussels has to still make decisions. The New York process starts around at the same time 
the United Nations General Assembly opens. The EU reads a speech at the UNGA First 
Committee opening where it presents the main interest for the Organisation. Before voting, they 
can reveal what they intend to vote, or after the vote, they can release an EoV explaining it. 
When voting, the unanimity can reveal itself and, it can be proved by analysing the EoV if it 
exists. 
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M.U. EN DIPLOMACIA Y ORGANIZACIONES INTERNACIONALES 
 40 
FIGURE 7 
 
 
Source: own construction  
 
 
Security is a very secret policy arena. There are no many public reports about the 
discussions and the meetings acts or a precise list of the main priorities and dangers each States 
goes through. Moreover, the documents since 2016 started to be less public and transparent. 
Since then, many States did not publish the EoVs on the internet, so the last years' analysis 
might be a bit less precise.  
 
Therefore, even though this paper has gone deeper in some of the areas of the gap, the 
European Union action in the First Committee of the UNGA still has multiple areas to analyse. 
Firstly, there must be a wider analysis of the lacking documents focusing principally on the 
EoVs that this paper has not discussed. Secondly, the Middle East change is a fascinating arena 
to explore and to understand. Further, the grouping creation in both the voting results and the 
EoVs publishing to comprehend their creation and logic also needs further investigation. 
Finally, it will be interesting to analyse further the role of the US and NATO. The US has a 
strong influence in the UK and France as seen in the data analysis, but as the data has also 
shown that there is a strong duality between being a NATO member, or not. Ergo, the 
importance of these actors in the First Committee topics is an attractive path to follow.   
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ANNEXE 
 
All the tables on this annexe have been constructed for this study using the data exposed in the 
Methodology.  
 
State codes 
 
The other code used are the acronym of the different EU MMSS used by the European Union.  
- Austria: AT 
- Belgium: BE 
- Bulgaria: BG 
- Croatia: HR 
- Cyprus: CY 
- Czech Republic: CZ 
- Denmark: DK 
- Estonia: EE 
- Finland: FI 
- France: FR 
- Germany: DE 
- Greece: EL 
- Hungary: HU 
- Ireland: IE 
- Italy: IT 
- Latvia: LV 
- Lithuania: LI 
- Luxembourg: LU 
- Malta: MT 
- Netherlands: NL 
- Poland: PL 
- Portugal: PT 
- Romania: RO 
- Slovakia: SK 
- Slovenia: SL 
- Spain: ES 
- Sweden: SE 
- United Kingdom: UK 
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Sponsorships  
TABLE 9 
200855 
 
 
TABLE 10 
200956 
 
 
 
 
55  L.5 Decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems; L.30 Towards a nuclear-weapon-free 
world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments; L.32 Compliance with non-
proliferation, arms limitation and disarmament agreements and commitments; L.36 Consolidation of peace 
through practical disarmament measures; L.38 The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile 
Proliferation; L.51 Transparency in armaments; L.55 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty; L.57 The illicit 
trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects; L.58 Renewed determination towards the total 
elimination of nuclear weapons  
 
56 L.36 Renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons; L.38 Rev1 The arms trade 
treaty; L. 42 Rev.1 The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects; L.47 Rev.1 Comprehensive 
Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty; L.49 Strengthening of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region; L.50 
Transparency in armaments; L.54 Towards a nuclear-weapon-free- world: accelerating the implementation of 
nuclear disarmament commitments 
  AT  BE  BG CY CZ DK EE FI FR DE  EL HU  IE IT LV LT LU MT NL PL PT RO SK SI ES SE  UK 
L.5                          X  
L.30                          X  
L.32 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X  X X X X X X X X X 
L.36 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X  X X X X X X X X X 
L.38 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
L.51 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
L.55  X X X X X  X X X X  X   X X  X X X  X X X X  
L.57 X X X X    X X X     X X X   X X  X  X X X 
L.58 X    X   X  X       X           
  AT  BE  BG CY CZ DK EE FI FR DE  EL HU  IE IT LV LT LU MT NL PL PT RO SK SI ES SE  UK 
L.36 X X X X X   X  X  X  X  X X  X    X X    
L.38 
Rev.1        X                   X 
L.42 
Rev.1 X  X     X X X  X X  X  X  X   X X X X X X 
L.47 
Rev.1 X X X X X X  X X X X X X X X X X  X X  X X X X X X 
L. 49 X X X X X X  X X X X X X X X X X X  X X X X X X X  
L.50 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
L.54             X             X  
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TABLE 11 
201057 
 
 
 
TABLE 12 
201158 
 
 
TABLE 13 
 
57 L.25 Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament 
commitments; L.36 Consolidation of peace through practical disarmament measures; L.38 Transparency and 
confidence-building measures in outer space activities; L.43 United action towards the total elimination of 
nuclear weapons; L.45 The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation; L.48 Comprehensive 
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty; L.49 Rev1 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
 
58 L.24 Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new 
systems of such weapons: report of the Conference on Disarmament; L.27 Conventional arms control at the 
regional and subregional levels; L.29 Transparency in armaments; L.31 Rev1 Towards a nuclear-weapon-free 
world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments; L.37 Comprehensive Nuclear-
Test-Ban Treaty; L.41 United action towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons; L.47 Rev1 Compliance 
with non-proliferation, arms limitation and disarmament agreements and commitments; L.50 The arms trade 
treaty 
 
  AT  BE  BG CY CZ DK EE FI FR DE  EL HU  IE IT LV LT LU MT NL PL PT RO SK SI ES SE  UK 
L.25             X             X  
L.36 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
L.38 X X X X X X  X X X X X X X  X X X  X X X X X X  X 
L.43 X X X X X X X X  X X X  X  X X  X X X X X X X   
L.45         X   X              X  
L.48 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X  X X X X X X X X X X X X 
L.49 
Rev1 X X X X X X X X X X  X X X  X X X X X X X X X X X  
  AT  BE  BG CY CZ DK EE FI FR DE  EL HU  IE IT LV LT LU MT NL PL PT RO SK SI ES SE  UK 
L.24                    X        
L.27              X              
L. 29 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
L.31 
Rev1             X             X  
L.37  X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
L.41 X X X X X X X X  X  X  X X X X  X X X X X X X   
L.47 
Rev1 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
L.50        X                   X 
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201259 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 14 
201360 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
59 L.13 Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament 
commitments; L.22 Transparency in armaments; L.23 The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile 
Proliferation; L. 24 Preventing and combating illicit brokering activities; L.43 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban 
Treaty; L.49 United action towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons 
 
60 L.4 The Arms Trade Treaty; L.18 Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of 
nuclear disarmament commitments; L.29 Rev1 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty; L.30 Transparency in 
armaments; L.31 National legislation on transfer of arms, military equipment and dual-use goods and 
technology; L.34 Taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations; L.43 United action towards the 
total elimination of nuclear weapons; L.52 Conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels 
 
  AT  BE  BG CY CZ DK EE FI FR DE  EL HU  IE IT LV LT LU MT NL PL PT RO SK SI ES SE  UK 
L.13             X             X  
l.22                   x         
L.23  X X  X X X  X X X  X X  X X X  X X  X X X X   
L.24   X X X    X X X     X X X   X  X X X  X  
L.43  X X X X X X X X X X  X X X X X X  X X X X X X X X X 
L.49  X X X X X X X X  X  X  X X X X  X X  X X X X   
  AT  BE  BG HR CY CZ DK EE FI FR DE  EL HU  IE IT LV LT LU MT NL PL PT RO SK SI ES SE  UK 
L.4         X                   X 
L.18               X               
L.29 
Rev1 
X X  X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X  X X X X X X X X  
L.30 X X    X X X X X X  X X X X X   X X X X  X X X X 
L.31                    X         
L.34 X      X       X               
L.43  X  X  X X      X   X X X  X X  X   X   
L.52               X              
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TABLE 15 
201461 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
61 L.5 Rev1 Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and 
Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction; L.10 Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and 
adjacent areas; L.12 Rev1 Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear 
disarmament commitments; L.21Taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations; L.25 The Hague 
Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation; L.30 Conventional arms control at the regional and 
subregional levels; L.32 Rev1 The Arms Trade Treaty; L.36 United action towards the total elimination of 
nuclear weapons; L.45 Compliance with non-proliferation, arms limitation and disarmament agreements and 
commitments; L.47 Women, disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control; L.48 Preventing and combating 
illicit brokering activities; L.56 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty; L.63 Implementation of the 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and 
on Their Destruction 
 
  AT  BE  BG HR CY CZ DK EE FI FR DE  EL HU  IE IT LV LT LU MT NL PL PT RO SK SI ES SE  UK 
L.5 
Rev1   X 
 
X X   X     X   X X X  X X X X X X   
L.10              X               
L.12 
Rev1    
 
         X               
L.12 X             X     X      X    
L.25 X X X X X X X X X X X  X X X X X X  X X X X X X X X X 
L.30               X              
L.32 
Rev1 X  X 
X 
X X X X X X X X  X X X X X  X X X  X X X X X 
L.36 X X X  X X X X X  X X X  X X X X X X X X X X X X  X 
L.45   X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
L.47 X  X  X X X  X X    X   X X X X  X  X X X X  
L.48   X X X X X X X X X  X X X X X X X  X X X X X X X X 
L.56  X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
L.63                     X        
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TABLE 16 
201562 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
62 L.13 Rev1 Taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations; L.26 United action towards the total 
elimination of nuclear weapons; L.27 Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 
Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction; L.34 Conventional arms 
control at the regional and subregional levels; L.35 Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent 
areas; L.37 Humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons; L.38 Humanitarian pledge for the prohibition and 
elimination of nuclear weapons; L.40 Ethical imperatives for a nuclear-weapon-free world; L.41 Rev1 Towards 
a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments; L.46 
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty; L.49 Rev1 Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions; 
L.50 Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of 
Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction; L.54 The Arms Trade Treaty;  
  AT  BE  BG HR CY CZ DK EE FI FR DE  EL HU  IE IT LV LT LU MT NL PL PT RO SK SI ES SE  UK 
L.13 
Rev1 X   
 
         X     X          
L.26  X X X  X X X X  X X X X X X  X  X X X  X X X X  
L.27                     X        
L.34               X              
L.35 X             X               
L.37 X             X     X        X  
L.38 X             X     X          
L.40 X             X               
L.41 
Rev1    
 
         X               
L.46 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
L.49 
Rev1  X X 
X 
 X X   X X  X X    X X X  X  X X  X X 
L.50     X                        
L.54 X      X X X   X   X     X  X  X X X X  
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TABLE 17 
201663 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
63 L.5 The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation; L.7 Rev1 Implementation of the 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on 
Their Destruction; L.9 Preventing and combating illicit brokering activities; L.21 Transparency in armaments; 
L.22 Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions: L.23 Humanitarian consequences of nuclear 
weapons; L.26 United action with renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons; L.28 
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: L.31 Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas; 
L.33 Decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems; L.35 Towards a nuclear-weapon-free 
world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments; L.36 Ethical imperatives for a 
nuclear-weapon-free world; L.41 Taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations; L.57 Rev1 
Nuclear disarmament verification; L.58 National legislation on transfer of arms, military equipment and dual-use 
goods and technology; L.61/Rev1 Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 
Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction 
  AT  BE  BG HR CY CZ DK EE FI FR DE  EL HU  IE IT LV LT LU MT NL PL PT RO SK SI ES SE  UK 
L.5 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X  X 
L.7 
Rev1 X X  
 
                        
L.9 X X X X  X X X X    X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
L.21 X  X X X X  X X X X  X X  X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
L.22 X X  X  X     X  X X X   X X X  X  X   X  
L.23 X    X         X     X        X  
L.26 X X X X  X X X X X X  X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X  
L.28 X X X X X X X X X    X X X X X X X X X X X  X X X  
L.29 X X X X X X X X X X X  X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
L.31 X             X        X       
L.33 X             X             X  
L.35 X             X               
L.36 X             X               
L.41  X             X     X          
L.57 
Rev1 X   
 
    X    X X  X  X  X X     X X X 
L.58                     X         
L. 61 
Rev1    
 
                X        
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TABLE 18 
201764 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
64 L.5 Humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons; L.6 Taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament 
negotiations; L.13 Rev1 Conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels; L.18 Towards a 
nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments; L.26 
Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of 
Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction; L.27 The Arms Trade Treaty; L.35 United action with renewed 
determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons; L.40 Implementation of the Convention on the 
Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction; 
L.41 Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions; L.42 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty; 
L.50 Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;  
 
  AT  BE  BG HR CY CZ DK EE FI FR DE  EL HU  IE IT LV LT LU MT NL PL PT RO SK SI ES SE  UK 
L.5 X             X     X        X  
L.6 X             X     X          
L.13 
Rev1    
 
          X              
L.18 X             X               
L.26                      X        
L.27  X X X X  X  X X X X X X X  X X X X X X X X X X X X  
L.35   X X  X  X X  X X X   X X X   X X X X  X  X 
L.40 X                            
L.41 X X  X  X    X X  X X    X X X  X  X X X X  
L.42 X X  X  X  X X X X X  X  X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
L.50                    X         
L.62 X             X               
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TABLE 19 
201865 
 
 
 
  
 
65 L.8 The Arms Trade Treaty; L 20 Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 
Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction; L.23 Humanitarian 
consequences of nuclear weapons; L.24 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons; L.25 The Hague Code of 
Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation; L.26 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty; L.30 
Strengthening of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region; L.31 Nuclear disarmament verification; 
L.35 Consolidation of peace through practical disarmament measures; L.39 Implementation of the Convention 
on Cluster Munitions; L.52 Decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems; L.53 
Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-
Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction; L.54 United action with renewed determination towards the total 
elimination of nuclear weapons; L.55 Preventing and combating illicit brokering activities; L.58 Treaty banning 
the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; L.62 Ethical 
imperatives for a nuclear-weapon-free world; L.63 The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its 
aspects; L.64 Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament 
commitments 
  AT  BE  BG HR CY CZ DK EE FI FR DE  EL HU  IE IT LV LT LU MT NL PL PT RO SK SI ES SE  UK 
L.8 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
L.20                     X        
L.23 X             X     X        X  
L.24 X             X               
L.25 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X  
L.26 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
L.30 X    X   X      X  X   X X  X      X 
L.31                    X        X 
L.35 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X  X X X X X X X 
L.39 X X X X  X X   X X   X X   X X X  X  X X X X  
L.52 X X       X     X    X X        X  
L.53 X                            
L.54   X X  X  X X  X X X  X X  X   X X X X X X   
L.55 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X  X X  
L.58           X         X         
L.63 X X X X X X X X  X X X   X X X X   X X X X  X X X 
L.64 X             X               
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EU statements at the First Assembly opening 
TABLE 20 
2008 Effective multilateral system 
Maintaining, implementing and strengthening the disarmament and non-proliferation treaties and agreements  
- strategy against the proliferation of mass destruction weapons 
- Non-Proliferation Treaty 
- Iranian Nuclear program 
- Denuclearisation of North Korea 
- Undeclared nuclear reactor in Syria 
- Prohibition of fissile material for nuclear power 
- Post-START (US and Russia) 
- Treaty banning the short and medium-range missiles 
- Biological Weapons 
- Chemical Weapons Convention 
- Illicit manufacture, transfer and flow of small arms and light weapons (SALW) 
Enhance detectability of violation to reinforce compliance and obligations under the multilateral treaty regime 
Fight against Terrorism 
Hague Code of Conduct 
Space activities 
Universalization of the treaties (non-State actors) 
Human consequences of cluster munitions  
Fight against anti-personnel mines 
Illicit trade in ammunition  
Transparency  
2009 Non-proliferation, disarmament and arms control  
- Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty 
- Regional security posed by proliferation of weapons of mass destruction  
- Conference on Disarmament of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty 
- Hague Code of Conduct and the Missile Technology Control Regime 
- SALW 
Transparency  
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Strengthening the multilateral system  
Peaceful uses of nuclear energy  
Space activities 
2010 Non-proliferation, disarmament and arms control together with confidence, transparency and reciprocity 
- NPT and make it credible (Iran and North Korea) 
- Conference on disarmament 
- CD of Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) 
- Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty  
- Hague Code of Conduct 
- Convention on the Prohibition of Biological and Toxin Weapons 
- SALW 
- Arms Trade Treaty  
- Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines 
- Convention on Cluster Munitions 
Effective multilateralism  
Peaceful use of nuclear energy  
Strengthening the security of activities in outer space 
 
2012 New START Treaty 
Risk of non-state actors (terrorist) gaining access to nuclear weapons 
Effective multilateralism 
Strengthening the multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation regime 
Arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, together with confidence and transparency 
- NPT and the NPT resolution on Middle East + proliferation challenges of Iran and Korea 
- FMCT 
- Chemical Weapons Convention  
- Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) 
- Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
- Proliferation of missiles with potential to deliver weapons of mass destruction  
- Arms Trade Treaty  
- SALW 
Peaceful use of nuclear energy  
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Strengthening the security of activities in outer space 
2013 Multilateralism 
Arms Trade Treaty 
Chemical Weapons Convention  
Organization for the prohibition of chemical weapons 
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention 
Proliferation challenges 
Syria and DPRK 
International Atomic Energy Agency 
Iran 
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
Middle East 
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
Outer space 
Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons 
Conference on disarmament 
Risk of weapons of mass destruction falling into the hands of terrorist 
2014 Humanitarian, socio-economic and security impact of conventional weapons and its use 
Arms Trade Treaty 
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
Ukraine 
Middle East, Syria and DPRK 
Peaceful uses of nuclear energy 
Increasing transparency and trust between countries  
OPCW 
Fact Finding Missions 
Outer Space 
2015 Arms Trade Treaty 
NPT 
Middle East 
Syria and the Chemical Weapons  
Fact Finding Mission 
Risk of non-state actors acquiring weapons of mass-destruction 
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty + North Korea 
Multilateral Negotiations on an International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities 
Empowerment of women  
2016 Effective multilateralism  
Gender equality  
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NPT 
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty + North Korea 
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action  
Chemical weapons in Syria 
BTWC 
Risk of terrorist acquiring mass destruction weapons 
Nuclear and radiological security 
Certain Conventional Weapons Convention  
Arms Trade Treaty  
Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention  
Safety, security and sustainability of the space environment 
Convention on Cluster Munition  
Ballistic missile technology  
Hague Code of Conduct 
Responsible state behaviour in cyberspace 
2017 Korea’s missile launches + NPT 
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty  
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action  
Hague Code of Conduct  
SALW 
Chemical Weapons 
Arms Trade Treaty 
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) 
START 
2018 Upholding the integrity of the rules-based international system with effective multilateralism as a key principle 
and the United Nations at its core. 
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action  
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Chemical Weapons Convention  
Fact Finding Mission  
Syria 
BTWC 
Improving and strengthening stability in cyber space 
NPT 
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
Conference on Disarmament on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty  
Zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East 
New START Treaty 
INF 
CEI, Centro Adscrito a la Universitat de Barcelona                                 Nº 3/2020, 2 DE SEPTIEMBRE DE 2020 
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SALW 
Arms Trade Treaty  
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COLECCIÓN TRABAJOS DE INVESTIGACIÓN DEL 
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Explanation of vote – Missing statements 
TABLE 21 
2008 L.26 NL    
 L.30 FR UK   
 L.37 IT    
 L.45 EU    
2009 L.4 EU    
 L.23 FR    
2010 L.10 SL    
 L.35 SL ES   
2011 L.27 PL    
 L.40 SL    
 L.49 FR/UK    
 L.51 ES    
2012 L.2 EU    
 L.16 BE NL   
 L.19 FR IT   
 L.41/Rev1 FR    
 L.46 SK BE   
 L.58 ES    
2013 L.26 SE    
 L.34 PT    
2015 L.11 FR* DE   
 L.13/Rev1 DE    
 L.15 BU SE   
 L.23 FR*    
 L.27 US+ 
(possible) 
   
 L.37 FI    
 L.38 FI    
 L.49 PL LV   
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 L.52/Rev1 AU UK   
2016 L.22 PL LV CY  
 L.23 FR*    
 L.24 FR*    
 L.36 FR*    
 L.41 FR DE   
 L.63 BE FR* NL DE 
 L.64 BU    
 L.66 FR*    
2017 L.6 FI    
 L.26 US+ 
(possible) 
FR   
 L.35 NL AU   
2018 L.1 UK    
 L.12 BE UK* NL  
 L.20 FR    
 L.24 BU SE   
 L.46 UK*    
 L.52 UK*    
 L.53/Rev1 DE    
 L.54 UK AU   
 L.57 SE    
 L.64 UK*    
 L.66 UK*    
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Voting report tables 
 
 
 
 AT BE BG CY CZ DK EE FI FR DE EL HU IE IT LV LT LU MT NL PL PT RO SK SI ES SE UK = 
Prohibition of the 
development and 
manufacture of new 
types of weapons of 
mass destruction 
and new systems of 
such weapons 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 54 
Developments in 
the field of 
information and 
telecommunications 
in the context of 
international 
security 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 54 
Conclusion of 
effective 
international 
arrangements to 
assure non nuclear-
weapon States 
against the use or 
threat of use of 
nuclear weapons 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 27 
Prevention of an 
arms race in outer 
space 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 54 
TABLE 22 
2008 
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Chemical 
Convention on the 
Prohibition of the 
Use, Stockpiling, 
Production and 
Transfer of Anti-
personnel Mines 
and on their 
Destruction 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 54 
Conventional arms 
control at the 
regional and 
subregional levels 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 54 
Nuclear 
disarmament 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 3 
Reducing nuclear 
danger 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Follow-up to the 
advisory opinion of 
the International 
Court of Justice on 
the Legality of the 
Threat or Use of 
Nuclear Weapons 
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 1 11 
Promotion of 
multilateralism in 
the area of 
disarmament and 
non proliferation 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 26 
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Follow-up to the 
advisory opinion of 
the International 
Court of Justice on 
the Legality of the 
Threat or Use of 
Nuclear Weapons 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 54 
Effects of the use of 
armaments and 
ammunitions 
containing depleted 
uranium 
2 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 0 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 33 
missiles 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 22 
Towards a nuclear-
weapon-free world: 
accelerating the 
implementation of 
nuclear 
disarmament 
commitments p4 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 52 
Towards a nuclear-
weapon-free world: 
accelerating the 
implementation of 
nuclear 
disarmament 
commitments 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 50 
Compliance with 
non-proliferation, 
arms limitation and 
disarmament 
agreements and 
commitments 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 54 
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Consolidation of 
peace through 
practical 
disarmament 
measures Pre 10 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 54 
Consolidation of 
peace through 
practical 
disarmament 
measures 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 54 
Establishment of a 
nuclear-weapon-
free zone in Central 
Asia 
2 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 0 30 
The Hague Code of 
Conduct against 
Ballistic Missile 
Proliferation 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 54 
Nuclear-weapon-
free southern 
hemisphere and 
adjacent areas P6 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 52 
Nuclear-weapon-
free southern 
hemisphere and 
adjacent areas 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 50 
Transparency and 
confidence-building 
measures in outer 
space activities 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 54 
Transparency in 
armaments p2 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 54 
Transparency in 
armaments p3 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 54 
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Transparency in 
armaments p4 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 54 
Transparency in 
armaments p5b 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 54 
Transparency in 
armaments p5 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 54 
Transparency in 
armaments p7 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 54 
Transparency in 
armaments 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 54 
The illicit trade in 
small arms and 
light weapons in all 
its aspects p4 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 54 
The illicit trade in 
small arms and 
light weapons in all 
its aspects p13 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 54 
The illicit trade in 
small arms and 
light weapons in all 
its aspects 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 54 
Renewed 
determination 
towards the total 
elimination of 
nuclear weapons 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 54 
Convention on the 
Prohibition of the 
Use of Nuclear 
Weapons 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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The risk of nuclear 
proliferation in the 
Middle East pre 6 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 54 
The risk of nuclear 
proliferation in the 
Middle East 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 54 
Comprehensive 
Nuclear-Test Ban 
Treaty 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 54 
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M.U. EN DIPLOMACIA Y ORGANIZACIONES INTERNACIONALES 
 
 
65 
 
 AT BE BG CY CZ DK EE FI FR DE EL HU IE IT LV LT LU MT NL PL PT RO SK SI ES SE UK = 
Implementation 
of the 
Declaration of 
the Indian 
Ocean as a 
Zone of Peace 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 25 
Establishment 
of a nuclear-
weapon-free 
zone in the 
region of the 
Middle East 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 54 
Conclusion of 
effective 
international 
arrangements 
to assure non-
nuclear-
weapon States 
against the use 
or threat of use 
of nuclear 
weapons 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 27 
Prevention of 
an arms race in 
outer space 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 54 
Follow-up to 
nuclear 
disarmament 
obligations 
agreed to at the 
1995 and 2000 
Review 
Conferences of 
the Parties to 
the Treaty on 
the Non-
Proliferation of 
Nuclear 
Weapons pro 6 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Follow-up to 
nuclear 
disarmament 
obligations 
agreed to at the 
1995 and 2000 
Review 
Conferences of 
the Parties to 
the Treaty on 
the Non-
Proliferation of 
Nuclear 
Weapons 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
TABLE 23 
2009 
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Promotion of 
multilateralism 
in the area of 
disarmament 
and non 
proliferation 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 26 
Reducing 
nuclear danger 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Treaty on the 
South-East 
Asia Nuclear-
Weapon-Free 
Zone (Bangkok 
Treaty) 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 52 
Conventional 
arms control at 
the regional 
and 
subregional 
levels 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 54 
Nuclear-
weapon-free 
southern 
hemisphere and 
adjacent areas 
P7 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 52 
Nuclear-
weapon-free 
southern 
hemisphere and 
adjacent areas 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 50 
Renewed 
determination 
towards the 
total 
elimination of 
nuclear 
weapons 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 53 
Arms Trade 
Treaty 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 54 
The illicit trade 
in small arms 
and light 
weapons in all 
its aspects P4 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 54 
The illicit trade 
in small arms 
and light 
weapons in all 
its aspects P15 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 54 
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The illicit trade 
in small arms 
and light 
weapons in all 
its aspects 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 54 
Nuclear 
disarmament 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 3 
Transparency 
in armaments 3 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 54 
Transparency 
in armaments 4 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 54 
Transparency 
in armaments 5 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 54 
Transparency 
in armaments 
6d 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 54 
Transparency 
in armaments 6 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 54 
Transparency 
in armaments 8 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 54 
Transparency 
in armaments 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 54 
Follow-up to 
the advisory 
opinion of the 
International 
Court of Justice 
on the Legality 
of the Threat or 
Use of Nuclear 
Weapons 
2 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 11 
Implementation 
of the 
Convention on 
the Prohibition 
of the Use, 
Stockpiling, 
Production and 
Transfer of 
Anti-personnel 
Mines and on 
their 
Destruction 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 54 
Towards a 
nuclear-
weapon-free 
world: 
accelerating the 
implementation 
of nuclear 
disarmament 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 53 
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commitments 
p4 
Towards a 
nuclear-
weapon-free 
world: 
accelerating the 
implementation 
of nuclear 
disarmament 
commitments 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 51 
Convention on 
the Prohibition 
of the Use of 
Nuclear 
Weapons 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
The risk of 
nuclear 
proliferation in 
the Middle East 
p6 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 54 
The risk of 
nuclear 
proliferation in 
the Middle East 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 54 
Comprehensive 
Nuclear-Test 
Ban Treaty p5 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 54 
Comprehensive 
Nuclear-Test 
Ban Treaty 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 54 
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 AT BE BG CY CZ DK EE FI FR DE EL HU IE IT LV LT LU MT NL PL PT RO SK SI ES SE UK = 
Conclusion of 
effective 
international 
arrangements to 
assure non 
nuclear-weapon 
States against the 
use or threat of 
use of nuclear 
weapons 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 27 
Prevention of an 
arms race in outer 
space 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 54 
Conventional 
arms control at 
the regional and 
subregional levels 
par. 2 
1 2 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 36 
Conventional 
arms control at 
the regional and 
subregional levels 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 54 
Implementation 
of the Convention 
on the Prohibition 
of the Use, 
Stockpiling, 
Production and 
Transfer of Anti-
personnel Mines 
and on their 
Destruction 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 54 
TABLE 24 
2010 
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Establishment of 
a nuclear-
weapon-free zone 
in Central Asia 
2 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 0 30 
Measures to 
uphold the 
authority of the 
1925 Geneva 
Protocol 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 54 
Promotion of 
multilateralism in 
the area of 
disarmament and 
non proliferation 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 26 
Effects of the use 
of armaments and 
ammunitions 
containing 
depleted uranium 
1 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 0 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 0 37 
Nuclear 
disarmament p15 
2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 49 
Nuclear 
disarmament 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 4 
Nuclear-weapon-
free southern 
hemisphere and 
adjacent areas p5 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 52 
Nuclear-weapon-
free southern 
hemisphere and 
adjacent areas 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 52 
Towards a 
nuclear-weapon-
free world: 
accelerating the 
implementation of 
nuclear 
disarmament 
commitments P12 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 53 
Towards a 
nuclear-weapon-
free world: 
accelerating the 
implementation of 
nuclear 
disarmament 
commitments 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 51 
Reducing nuclear 
danger 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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M.U. EN DIPLOMACIA Y ORGANIZACIONES INTERNACIONALES 
 
 
71 
Treaty banning 
the production of 
fissile material for 
nuclear weapons 
or other nuclear 
explosive devices 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 54 
Convening of the 
fourth special 
session of the 
General 
Assembly 
devoted to 
disarmament p3 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 52 
Convening of the 
fourth special 
session of the 
General 
Assembly 
devoted to 
disarmament 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 52 
Consolidation of 
peace through 
practical 
disarmament 
measures p6 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 54 
Transparency and 
confidence-
building measures 
in outer space 
activities 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 54 
Decreasing the 
operational 
readiness of 
nuclear weapons 
systems p1 
2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 46 
Decreasing the 
operational 
readiness of 
nuclear weapons 
systems 
2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 0 2 2 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 0 43 
United action 
towards the total 
elimination of 
nuclear weapons 
p2 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 54 
United action 
towards the total 
elimination of 
nuclear weapons 
p8 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 54 
United action 
towards the total 
elimination of 
nuclear weapons 
p9 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 54 
United action 
towards the total 
elimination of 
nuclear weapons 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 54 
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M.U. EN DIPLOMACIA Y ORGANIZACIONES INTERNACIONALES 
 
 
72 
The Hague Code 
of Conduct 
against Ballistic 
Missile 
Proliferation 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 54 
Preventing and 
combating illicit 
brokering 
activities p12 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 54 
Preventing and 
combating illicit 
brokering 
activities 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 54 
Follow-up to the 
advisory opinion 
of the 
International 
Court of Justice 
on the Legality of 
the Threat or Use 
of Nuclear 
Weapons 
2 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 11 
Convention on the 
Prohibition of the 
Use of Nuclear 
Weapons 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
The risk of 
nuclear 
proliferation in 
the Middle East  
p5 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 54 
The risk of 
nuclear 
proliferation in 
the Middle East  
p6 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 54 
The risk of 
nuclear 
proliferation in 
the Middle East 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 54 
Comprehensive 
Nuclear-Test Ban 
Treaty p6 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 54 
Comprehensive 
Nuclear-Test Ban 
Treaty 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 54 
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COLECCIÓN TRABAJOS DE INVESTIGACIÓN DEL 
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 AT BE BG CY CZ DK EE FI FR DE EL HU IE IT LV LT LU MT NL PL PT RO SK SI ES SE UK = 
Compliance with non-
proliferation, arms 
limitation and 
disarmament 
agreements and 
commitments 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 54 
Implementation of the 
Declaration of the 
Indian Ocean as a 
Zone of Peace 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 25 
Conclusion of 
effective international 
arrangements to 
assure non nuclear-
weapon States against 
the use or threat of 
use of nuclear 
weapons 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 27 
Prevention of an arms 
race in outer space 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 54 
TABLE 25 
2011 
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M.U. EN DIPLOMACIA Y ORGANIZACIONES INTERNACIONALES 
 
 
74 
Follow-up to nuclear 
disarmament 
obligations agreed to 
at the 1995 and 2000 
Review Conferences 
of the Parties to the 
Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons 
pre6 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 27 
Follow-up to nuclear 
disarmament 
obligations agreed to 
at the 1995 and 2000 
Review Conferences 
of the Parties to the 
Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons p9 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 25 
Follow-up to nuclear 
disarmament 
obligations agreed to 
at the 1995 and 2000 
Review Conferences 
of the Parties to the 
Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Implementation of the 
Convention on the 
Prohibition of the 
Use, Stockpiling, 
Production and 
Transfer of Anti-
personnel Mines and 
on their Destruction 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 54 
Promotion of 
multilateralism in the 
area of disarmament 
and non proliferation 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 26 
2015 Review 
Conference of the 
Parties to the Treaty 
on the Non-
Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons and 
its Preparatory 
Committee p7 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 54 
2015 Review 
Conference of the 
Parties to the Treaty 
on the Non-
Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons and 
its Preparatory 
Committee 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 54 
Conventional arms 
control at the regional 
and subregional levels 
p2 
1 2 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 30 
Conventional arms 
control at the regional 
and subregional levels 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 54 
Transparency in 
armaments” p2 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 54 
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Transparency in 
armaments p3 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 54 
Transparency in 
armaments p4 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 54 
Transparency in 
armaments p5b 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 54 
Transparency in 
armaments p5 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 54 
Transparency in 
armaments p7 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 54 
Transparency in 
armaments 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 54 
Towards a nuclear-
weapon-free world: 
accelerating the 
implementation of 
nuclear disarmament 
commitments P1 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 52 
Towards a nuclear-
weapon-free world: 
accelerating the 
implementation of 
nuclear disarmament 
commitments P9 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 52 
Towards a nuclear-
weapon-free world: 
accelerating the 
implementation of 
nuclear disarmament 
commitments 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 50 
Treaty banning the 
production of fissile 
material for nuclear 
weapons or other 
nuclear explosive 
devices p2 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 54 
Treaty banning the 
production of fissile 
material for nuclear 
weapons or other 
nuclear explosive 
devices p3 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 54 
Treaty banning the 
production of fissile 
material for nuclear 
weapons or other 
nuclear explosive 
devices 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 54 
United action towards 
the total elimination 
of nuclear weapons 
P2 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 54 
United action towards 
the total elimination 
of nuclear weapons 
p8 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 54 
United action towards 
the total elimination 
of nuclear weapons 
p9 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 54 
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United action towards 
the total elimination 
of nuclear weapons 
p15 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 54 
United action towards 
the total elimination 
of nuclear weapons 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 54 
Follow-up to the 
advisory opinion of 
the International 
Court of Justice on 
the Legality of the 
Threat or Use of 
Nuclear Weapons 
2 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 11 
Reducing nuclear 
danger 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Compliance with non-
proliferation, arms 
limitation and 
disarmament 
agreements and 
commitments 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 54 
Nuclear disarmament 
p14 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 1 48 
Nuclear disarmament 
p16 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 52 
Nuclear disarmament 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 4 
The Arms Trade 
Treaty 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 54 
Convention on the 
Prohibition of the Use 
of Nuclear Weapons 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
The risk of nuclear 
proliferation in the 
Middle East p5 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 54 
The risk of nuclear 
proliferation in the 
Middle East p6 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 54 
The risk of nuclear 
proliferation in the 
Middle East p7 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 54 
The risk of nuclear 
proliferation in the 
Middle East 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 54 
Comprehensive 
Nuclear-Test Ban 
Treaty p6 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 54 
Comprehensive 
Nuclear-Test Ban 
Treaty 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 54 
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 AT BE BG CY CZ DK EE FI FR DE EL HU IE IT LV LT LU MT NL PL PT RO SK SI ES SE UK = 
Conclusion of 
effective 
international 
arrangements to 
assure non 
nuclear-weapon 
States against 
the use or threat 
of use of 
nuclear 
weapons 
1 1 x 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 x 24 
TABLE 26 
2012 
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Prevention of an 
arms race in 
outer space 
2 2 x 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 x 50 
Establishment 
of a nuclear-
weapon-free 
zone in Central 
Asia 
2 1 x 2 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 x 29 
Implementation 
of the 
Convention on 
the Prohibition 
of the Use, 
Stockpiling, 
Production and 
Transfer of 
Anti-personnel 
Mines and on 
their 
Destruction 
2 2 x 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 x 50 
Follow-up to the 
advisory 
opinion of the 
International 
Court of Justice 
on the Legality 
of the Threat or 
Use of Nuclear 
Weapons 
2 0 x 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 x 11 
Towards a 
nuclear-
weapon-free 
world: 
accelerating the 
implementation 
of nuclear 
disarmament 
commitments 
p11 
2 2 x 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 50 
Towards a 
nuclear-
weapon-free 
world: 
accelerating the 
implementation 
of nuclear 
disarmament 
commitments 
2 2 x 2 2 2 2 2 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 48 
Measures to 
uphold the 
authority of the 
1925 Geneva 
Protocol 
2 2 x 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 52 
Effects of the 
use of 
armaments and 
ammunitions 
containing 
depleted 
uranium 
2 2 x 2 1 1 1 2 0 2 2 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 0 36 
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COLECCIÓN TRABAJOS DE INVESTIGACIÓN DEL 
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Promotion of 
multilateralism 
in the area of 
disarmament 
and non 
proliferation 
1 1 x 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 25 
High-level 
meeting of the 
General 
Assembly on 
nuclear 
disarmament 
2 2 x 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 49 
The Hague 
Code of 
Conduct against 
Ballistic Missile 
Proliferation 
2 2 x 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 52 
Preventing and 
combating illicit 
brokering 
activities p12, 
2 2 x 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 52 
Preventing and 
combating illicit 
brokering 
activities P13 
2 2 x 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 52 
Preventing and 
combating illicit 
brokering 
activities 
2 2 x 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 52 
Reducing 
nuclear danger 
0 0 x 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Decreasing the 
operational 
readiness of 
nuclear 
weapons 
systems p8 
2 2 x 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 0 42 
Decreasing the 
operational 
readiness of 
nuclear 
weapons 
systems 
2 2 x 2 1 2 1 2 0 2 2 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 0 40 
Treaty banning 
the production 
of fissile 
material for 
nuclear 
weapons or 
other nuclear 
explosive 
devices 
2 2 x 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 52 
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Treaty banning 
the production 
of fissile 
material for 
nuclear 
weapons or 
other nuclear 
explosive 
devices 
2 2 x 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 52 
Nuclear-
weapon-free 
southern 
hemisphere and 
adjacent areas 
2 2 x 2 2 2 2 2 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 48 
Promotion of 
multilateralism 
in the area of 
disarmament 
and non 
proliferation 
2 2 x 2 1 2 2 2 0 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 0 39 
United action 
towards the total 
elimination of 
nuclear 
weapons p2 
2 2 x 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 52 
United action 
towards the total 
elimination of 
nuclear 
weapons p8 
2 2 x 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 52 
United action 
towards the total 
elimination of 
nuclear 
weapons  p9 
2 2 x 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 52 
United action 
towards the total 
elimination of 
nuclear 
weapons p16 
2 2 x 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 52 
United action 
towards the total 
elimination of 
nuclear 
weapons 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 54 
Conventional 
arms control at 
the regional and 
subregional 
levels p2 
1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 33 
Conventional 
arms control at 
the regional and 
subregional 
levels 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 54 
Transparency in 
armaments 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 54 
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Convention on 
the Prohibition 
of the Use of 
Nuclear 
Weapons 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
The risk of 
nuclear 
proliferation in 
the Middle East 
p5 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 54 
The risk of 
nuclear 
proliferation in 
the Middle East 
6p 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 54 
The risk of 
nuclear 
proliferation in 
the Middle East 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 54 
Comprehensive 
Nuclear-Test 
Ban Treaty pre6 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 54 
Comprehensive 
Nuclear-Test 
Ban Treaty 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 54 
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 AT BE BG HR CY CZ DK EE FI FR DE EL HU IE IT LV LT LU MT NL PL PT RO SK SI ES SE UK = 
Implementation 
of the 
Declaration of 
the Indian 
Ocean as a 
Zone of Peace 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 26 
Conclusion of 
effective 
international 
arrangements 
to assure non 
nuclear-
weapon States 
against the use 
or threat of use 
of nuclear 
weapons 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 28 
Prevention of 
an arms race in 
outer space 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
Implementation 
of the 
Convention on 
the Prohibition 
of the Use, 
Stockpiling, 
Production and 
Transfer of 
Anti-personnel 
Mines and on 
their 
Destruction 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
The Arms 
Trade Treaty  
p1 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
The Arms 
Trade Treaty 
p3 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
The Arms 
Trade Treaty 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
Follow-up to 
the 2013 high-
level meeting 
of the General 
Assembly on 
nuclear 
disarmament 
2 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 13 
TABLE 27 
2013 
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Follow-up to 
nuclear 
disarmament 
obligations 
agreed to at the 
1995 and 2000 
Review 
Conferences of 
the Parties to 
the Treaty on 
the Non-
Proliferation of 
Nuclear 
Weapons P6 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 28 
Follow-up to 
nuclear 
disarmament 
obligations 
agreed to at the 
1995 and 2000 
Review 
Conferences of 
the Parties to 
the Treaty on 
the Non-
Proliferation of 
Nuclear 
WeaponsP9 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 26 
Follow-up to 
nuclear 
disarmament 
obligations 
agreed to at the 
1995 and 2000 
Review 
Conferences of 
the Parties to 
the Treaty on 
the Non-
Proliferation of 
Nuclear 
Weapons 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Promotion of 
multilateralism 
in the area of 
disarmament 
and non 
proliferation 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 27 
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Towards a 
nuclear-
weapon-free 
world: 
accelerating the 
implementation 
of nuclear 
disarmament 
commitments 
p9 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 54 
Towards a 
nuclear-
weapon-free 
world: 
accelerating the 
implementation 
of nuclear 
disarmament 
commitments 
p11 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 54 
Towards a 
nuclear-
weapon-free 
world: 
accelerating the 
implementation 
of nuclear 
disarmament 
commitments 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 52 
Reducing 
nuclear danger 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Follow-up to 
the advisory 
opinion of the 
International 
Court of Justice 
on the Legality 
of the Threat or 
Use of Nuclear 
Weapons 
2 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 12 
Transparency 
in armaments 
pre6 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
Transparency 
in armaments 
pre7 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
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Transparency 
in armaments 
p3 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
Transparency 
in armaments 
p4 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
Transparency 
in armaments 
p5 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
Transparency 
in armaments 
p6a 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
Transparency 
in armaments 
p6b 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
Transparency 
in armaments 
p6 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
Transparency 
in armaments 
p8 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
Transparency 
in armaments 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
National 
legislation on 
transfer of 
arms, military 
equipment and 
dual-use goods 
and technology 
7pre 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
National 
legislation on 
transfer of 
arms, military 
equipment and 
dual-use goods 
and technology  
pre8 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
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National 
legislation on 
transfer of 
arms, military 
equipment and 
dual-use goods 
and technology 
P1 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
National 
legislation on 
transfer of 
arms, military 
equipment and 
dual-use goods 
and technology 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
Promotion of 
multilateralism 
in the area of 
disarmament 
and non 
proliferation 
2 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 0 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 0 43 
Nuclear 
disarmament 
p16 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 53 
Nuclear 
disarmament 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 4 
United action 
towards the 
total 
elimination of 
nuclear 
weapons P2 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
United action 
towards the 
total 
elimination of 
nuclear 
weapons  P8 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
United action 
towards the 
total 
elimination of 
nuclear 
weapons  P9 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
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United action 
towards the 
total 
elimination of 
nuclear 
weapons P17 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
United action 
towards the 
total 
elimination of 
nuclear 
weapons 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
Conventional 
arms control at 
the regional 
and 
subregional 
levels P2 
2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 35 
Conventional 
arms control at 
the regional 
and 
subregional 
levels 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
Treaty banning 
the production 
of fissile 
material for 
nuclear 
weapons or 
other nuclear 
explosive 
devices 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
Convention on 
the Prohibition 
of the Use of 
Nuclear 
Weapons 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
The risk of 
nuclear 
proliferation in 
the Middle East 
p5 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
The risk of 
nuclear 
proliferation in 
the Middle East 
p6 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
The risk of 
nuclear 
proliferation in 
the Middle East 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
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Comprehensive 
Nuclear-Test 
Ban Treaty p6 
preamble 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
Comprehensive 
Nuclear-Test 
Ban Treaty 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 AT BE BG HR CY CZ DK EE FI FR DE EL HU IE IT LV LT LU MT NL PL PT RO SK SI ES SE UK = 
Compliance 
with non-
proliferation, 
arms limitation 
and 
disarmament 
agreements and 
commitments 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
Conclusion of 
effective 
international 
arrangements to 
assure non 
nuclear-weapon 
States against 
the use or threat 
of use of 
nuclear 
weapons 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 28 
Prevention of an 
arms race in 
outer space 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
No first 
placement of 
weapons in 
outer space 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 28 
Implementation 
of the 
Convention on 
the Prohibition 
of the Use, 
Stockpiling, 
Production and 
Transfer of 
Anti-personnel 
Mines and on 
their 
Destruction 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
TABLE 28 
2014 
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Nuclear-
weapon-free 
southern 
hemisphere and 
adjacent areas 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 52 
Towards a 
nuclear-
weapon-free 
world: 
accelerating the 
implementation 
of nuclear 
disarmament 
commitments 
Preamble 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 54 
Towards a 
nuclear-
weapon-free 
world: 
accelerating the 
implementation 
of nuclear 
disarmament 
commitments  
P9 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 54 
Towards a 
nuclear-
weapon-free 
world: 
accelerating the 
implementation 
of nuclear 
disarmament 
commitments  
P11 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 54 
Towards a 
nuclear-
weapon-free 
world: 
accelerating the 
implementation 
of nuclear 
disarmament 
commitments 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 52 
Reducing 
nuclear danger 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Promotion of 
multilateralism 
in the area of 
disarmament 
and non 
proliferation 
2 2 2 2 1 1 2 1 2 0 2 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 0 43 
Decreasing the 
operational 
readiness of 
nuclear 
weapons 
systems p8 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 50 
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Decreasing the 
operational 
readiness of 
nuclear 
weapons 
systems 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 0 2 2 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 48 
Follow-up to the 
advisory 
opinion of the 
International 
Court of Justice 
on the Legality 
of the Threat or 
Use of Nuclear 
Weapons 
0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 13 
The Hague 
Code of 
Conduct against 
Ballistic Missile 
Proliferation 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
Conventional 
arms control at 
the regional and 
subregional 
levels p2 
1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 0 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 35 
Conventional 
arms control at 
the regional and 
subregional 
levels 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
Nuclear 
disarmament 
p16 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 52 
Nuclear 
disarmament 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 4 
The Arms Trade 
Treaty p. 3 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
The Arms Trade 
Treaty 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
United action 
towards the total 
elimination of 
nuclear 
weapons p3 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
United action 
towards the total 
elimination of 
nuclear 
weapons p11 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
United action 
towards the total 
elimination of 
nuclear 
weapons p17 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
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United action 
towards the total 
elimination of 
nuclear 
weapons p20 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
United action 
towards the total 
elimination of 
nuclear 
weapons 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
Measures to 
uphold the 
authority of the 
1925 Geneva 
Protocol 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
Promotion of 
multilateralism 
in the area of 
disarmament 
and non 
proliferation 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 27 
Effects of the 
use of 
armaments and 
ammunitions 
containing 
depleted 
uranium 
2 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 0 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 0 39 
Follow-up to the 
2013 high-level 
meeting of the 
General 
Assembly on 
nuclear 
disarmament 
2 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 2 0 16 
Compliance 
with non-
proliferation, 
arms limitation 
and 
disarmament 
agreements and 
commitments 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
Women, 
disarmament, 
non-
proliferation 
and arms 
control P8 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
Women, 
disarmament, 
non-
proliferation 
and arms 
control 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
Preventing and 
combating illicit 
brokering 
activities p8 
preamble 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
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Preventing and 
combating illicit 
brokering 
activities 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
Third 
Conference of 
States Parties 
and Signatories 
to Treaties that 
Establish 
Nuclear-
Weapon-Free 
Zones and 
Mongolia, 2015 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 54 
Implementation 
of the 
Convention on 
the Prohibition 
of the 
Development, 
Production, 
Stockpiling and 
Use of 
Chemical 
Weapons and on 
Their 
Destruction P 4 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
Implementation 
of the 
Convention on 
the Prohibition 
of the 
Development, 
Production, 
Stockpiling and 
Use of 
Chemical 
Weapons and on 
Their 
Destruction P 5 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
Implementation 
of the 
Convention on 
the Prohibition 
of the 
Development, 
Production, 
Stockpiling and 
Use of 
Chemical 
Weapons and on 
Their 
Destruction 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
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Treaty banning 
the production 
of fissile 
material for 
nuclear 
weapons or 
other nuclear 
explosive 
devices 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
Open-ended 
Working Group 
on the Fourth 
Special Session 
of the General 
Assembly 
Devoted to 
Disarmament 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 54 
Convention on 
the Prohibition 
of the Use of 
Nuclear 
Weapons 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
The risk of 
nuclear 
proliferation in 
the Middle East  
p5 
2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 54 
The risk of 
nuclear 
proliferation in 
the Middle East 
p6 
2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 54 
The risk of 
nuclear 
proliferation in 
the Middle East 
2 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 47 
Comprehensive 
Nuclear-Test 
Ban Treaty p7 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
Comprehensive 
Nuclear-Test 
Ban Treaty 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
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  AT  BE  BG HR CY CZ DK EE FI FR DE  EL HU  IE IT LV LT LU MT NL PL PT RO SK SI ES SE  UK =  
Implementation 
of the 
Declaration of 
the Indian 
Ocean as a 
Zone of Peace 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 26 
TABLE 29 
2015 
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Conclusion of 
effective 
international 
arrangements 
to assure non 
nuclear-
weapon States 
against the use 
or threat of use 
of nuclear 
weapons 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 28 
Prevention of 
an arms race in 
outer space 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
No first 
placement of 
weapons in 
outer space 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 28 
2020 Review 
Conference of 
the Parties to 
the Treaty on 
the Non-
Proliferation of 
Nuclear 
Weapons and 
its Preparatory 
Committee 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
Observance of 
environmental 
norms in the 
drafting and 
implementation 
of agreements 
on 
disarmament 
and arms 
control 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 28 
Taking forward 
multilateral 
nuclear 
disarmament 
negotiations 
2 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 2 1 0 0 1 2 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 2 0 24 
Follow-up to 
the 2013 high-
level meeting 
of the General 
Assembly on 
nuclear 
disarmament 
2 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 2 0 15 
Reducing 
nuclear danger 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Follow-up to 
nuclear 
disarmament 
obligations 
agreed to at the 
1995 and 2000 
Review 
Conferences of 
the Parties to 
the Treaty on 
the Non-
Proliferation of 
Nuclear 
Weapons p6 
2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 29 
Follow-up to 
nuclear 
disarmament 
obligations 
agreed to at the 
1995 and 2000 
Review 
Conferences of 
the Parties to 
the Treaty on 
the Non-
Proliferation of 
Nuclear 
Weapons 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Treaty banning 
the production 
of fissile 
material for 
nuclear 
weapons or 
other nuclear 
explosive 
devices 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
United action 
towards the 
total 
elimination of 
nuclear 
weapons p.5 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
United action 
towards the 
total 
elimination of 
nuclear 
weapons p.15 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
United action 
towards the 
total 
elimination of 
nuclear 
weapons p19 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 55 
United action 
towards the 
total 
elimination of 
nuclear 
weapons 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 54 
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Implementation 
of the 
Convention on 
the Prohibition 
of the 
Development, 
Production, 
Stockpiling and 
Use of 
Chemical 
Weapons and 
on Their 
Destruction pre  
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
Implementation 
of the 
Convention on 
the Prohibition 
of the 
Development, 
Production, 
Stockpiling and 
Use of 
Chemical 
Weapons and 
on Their 
Destruction 
p10 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
Implementation 
of the 
Convention on 
the Prohibition 
of the 
Development, 
Production, 
Stockpiling and 
Use of 
Chemical 
Weapons and 
on Their 
Destruction 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
Conventional 
arms control at 
the regional 
and 
subregional 
levels p2 
1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 35 
Conventional 
arms control at 
the regional 
and 
subregional 
levels 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
Nuclear-
weapon-free 
southern 
hemisphere and 
adjacent areas 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 52 
Humanitarian 
Consequences 
of Nuclear 
Weapons 
2 1 1 0 2 0 1 0 2 0 1 1 0 2 0 0 0 1 2 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 2 0 22 
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COLECCIÓN TRABAJOS DE INVESTIGACIÓN DEL 
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Humanitarian 
pledge for the 
prohibition and 
elimination of 
nuclear 
weapons 
2 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 14 
Ethical 
imperatives for 
a nuclear-
weapon-free 
world 
2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 8 
Towards a 
nuclear-
weapon-free 
world: 
accelerating the 
implementation 
of nuclear 
disarmament 
commitments 
p13 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 53 
Towards a 
nuclear-
weapon-free 
world: 
accelerating the 
implementation 
of nuclear 
disarmament 
commitments 
2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 0 31 
Nuclear 
disarmament 
P16 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 53 
Nuclear 
disarmament 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 4 
Convention on 
Cluster 
Munitions 
2 2 2 2 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 50 
Implementation 
of the 
Convention on 
the Prohibition 
of the Use, 
Stockpiling, 
Production and 
Transfer of 
Anti-personnel 
Mines and on 
their 
Destruction 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
Follow-up to 
the advisory 
opinion of the 
International 
Court of Justice 
on the Legality 
of the Threat or 
Use of Nuclear 
Weapons 
2 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 13 
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M.U. EN DIPLOMACIA Y ORGANIZACIONES INTERNACIONALES 
 
 
99 
Universal 
Declaration on 
the 
Achievement 
of a Nuclear-
Weapon-Free-
World 
2 0 1 1 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 2 0 14 
The Arms 
Trade Treaty 
P3 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
The Arms 
Trade Treaty 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
Convention on 
the Prohibition 
of the Use of 
Nuclear 
Weapons 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
The risk of 
nuclear 
proliferation in 
the Middle East 
preamble 5 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
The risk of 
nuclear 
proliferation in 
the Middle East 
preamble 6 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
The risk of 
nuclear 
proliferation in 
the Middle East 
2 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 46 
Comprehensive 
Nuclear-Test 
Ban Treaty  p6  
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
Comprehensive 
Nuclear-Test 
Ban Treaty 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
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  AT  BE  BG HR CY CZ DK EE FI FR DE  EL HU  IE IT LV LT LU MT NL PL PT RO SK SI ES SE  UK  = 
Developments in 
the field of 
information and 
telecommunications 
in the context of 
international 
security 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
Conclusion of 
effective 
international 
arrangements to 
assure non nuclear-
weapon States 
against the use or 
threat of use of 
nuclear weapons 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 28 
Prevention of an 
arms race in outer 
space 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
No first placement 
of weapons in outer 
space 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 28 
The Hague Code of 
Conduct against 
Ballistic Missile 
Proliferation 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
Implementation of 
the Convention on 
the Prohibition of 
the Use, 
Stockpiling, 
Production and 
Transfer of Anti-
personnel Mines 
and on their 
Destruction 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
Preventing and 
combating illicit 
brokering activities 
P8 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
TABLE 30 
2016 
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Preventing and 
combating illicit 
brokering activities 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
Reducing nuclear 
danger 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Conventional arms 
control at the 
regional and 
subregional levels 
Preamble 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
Conventional arms 
control at the 
regional and 
subregional levels 
P2 
1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 38 
Conventional arms 
control at the 
regional and 
subregional levels 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
Transparency in 
armaments  pre 4  
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
Transparency in 
armaments  pre 7 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
Transparency in 
armaments  pre 8 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
Transparency in 
armaments p3 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
Transparency in 
armaments p4 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
Transparency in 
armaments p6c 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
Transparency in 
armaments p7 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
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Transparency in 
armaments 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
Convention on 
Cluster Munitions 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
Humanitarian 
Consequences of 
Nuclear Weapons 
2 1 1 1 2 0 1 0 2 0 1 2 0 2 1 0 0 1 2 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 2 0 25 
Humanitarian 
pledge for the 
prohibition and 
elimination of 
nuclear weapons 
2 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 11 
United action 
towards the total 
elimination of 
nuclear weapons 
p.5 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
United action 
towards the total 
elimination of 
nuclear weapons 
p20 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 54 
United action 
towards the total 
elimination of 
nuclear weapons 
p27 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
United action 
towards the total 
elimination of 
nuclear weapons 
total 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 54 
The Arms Trade 
Treaty 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
Nuclear-weapon-
free southern 
hemisphere and 
adjacent areas 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 52 
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Decreasing the 
operational 
readiness of nuclear 
weapons systems 
pre8 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 53 
Decreasing the 
operational 
readiness of nuclear 
weapons systems 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 51 
Towards a nuclear-
weapon-free world: 
accelerating the 
implementation of 
nuclear 
disarmament 
commitments p-14 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 54 
Towards a nuclear-
weapon-free world: 
accelerating the 
implementation of 
nuclear 
disarmament 
commitments 
2 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 1 1 2 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 16 
Ethical imperatives 
for a nuclear-
weapon-free world 
2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 8 
Women, 
disarmament, non-
proliferation and 
arms control 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
Follow-up to the 
advisory opinion of 
the International 
Court of Justice on 
the Legality of the 
Threat or Use of 
Nuclear Weapons 
2 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 13 
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Measures to uphold 
the authority of the 
1925 Geneva 
Protocol 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
Promotion of 
multilateralism in 
the area of 
disarmament and 
non proliferation 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 27 
Nuclear 
disarmament P16 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 54 
Nuclear 
disarmament 
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 4 
Nuclear 
disarmament 
verification par1  
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
Nuclear 
disarmament 
verification 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
National legislation 
on transfer of arms, 
military equipment 
and dual-use goods 
and technology par 
7 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
National legislation 
on transfer of arms, 
military equipment 
and dual-use goods 
and technology par 
8 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
National legislation 
on transfer of arms, 
military equipment 
and dual-use goods 
and technology p1 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
National legislation 
on transfer of arms, 
military equipment 
and dual-use goods 
and technology 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
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Implementation of 
the Convention on 
the Prohibition of 
the Development, 
Production, 
Stockpiling and 
Use of Chemical 
Weapons and on 
Their Destruction 
preamb 3 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
Implementation of 
the Convention on 
the Prohibition of 
the Development, 
Production, 
Stockpiling and 
Use of Chemical 
Weapons and on 
Their Destruction 
preamb 4 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
Implementation of 
the Convention on 
the Prohibition of 
the Development, 
Production, 
Stockpiling and 
Use of Chemical 
Weapons and on 
Their Destruction 
p2  
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
Implementation of 
the Convention on 
the Prohibition of 
the Development, 
Production, 
Stockpiling and 
Use of Chemical 
Weapons and on 
Their Destruction 
p13  
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
Implementation of 
the Convention on 
the Prohibition of 
the Development, 
Production, 
Stockpiling and 
Use of Chemical 
Weapons and on 
Their Destruction 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
Effects of the use of 
armaments and 
ammunitions 
containing depleted 
uranium 
2 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 0 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 0 39 
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M.U. EN DIPLOMACIA Y ORGANIZACIONES INTERNACIONALES 
 
 
106 
Follow-up to the 
2013 high-level 
meeting of the 
General Assembly 
on nuclear 
disarmament 
2 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 13 
Convention on the 
Prohibition of the 
Use of Nuclear 
Weapons 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
The risk of nuclear 
proliferation in the 
Middle East 
preamble 5 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
The risk of nuclear 
proliferation in the 
Middle East 
preamble  6  
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
The risk of nuclear 
proliferation in the 
Middle East 
2 1 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 43 
Comprehensive 
Nuclear-Test Ban 
Treaty p4  
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
Comprehensive 
Nuclear-Test Ban 
Treaty p5 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
Comprehensive 
Nuclear-Test Ban 
Treaty 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
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M.U. EN DIPLOMACIA Y ORGANIZACIONES INTERNACIONALES 
 
 
107 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  AT  BE  BG HR CY CZ DK EE FI FR DE  EL HU  IE IT LV LT LU MT NL PL PT RO SK SI ES SE  UK  = 
Implementation of 
the Declaration of 
the Indian Ocean as 
a Zone of Peace 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 27 
Compliance with 
non-proliferation, 
arms limitation and 
disarmament 
agreements and 
commitments 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
Developments in 
the field of 
information and 
telecommunications 
in the context of 
international 
security 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
TABLE 31 
2017 
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Conclusion of 
effective 
international 
arrangements to 
assure non nuclear-
weapon States 
against the use or 
threat of use of 
nuclear weapons 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 28 
Prevention of an 
arms race in outer 
space 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
No first placement 
of weapons in outer 
space 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 28 
Follow-up to 
nuclear 
disarmament 
obligations agreed 
to at the 1995 and 
2000 Review 
Conferences of the 
Parties to the 
Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons 
parf 6 preamb 
2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 29 
Follow-up to 
nuclear 
disarmament 
obligations agreed 
to at the 1995 and 
2000 Review 
Conferences of the 
Parties to the 
Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
Humanitarian 
Consequences of 
Nuclear Weapons 
2 1 1 1 2 0 1 0 2 0 1 2 0 2 1 0 0 1 2 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 2 0 26 
Taking forward 
multilateral nuclear 
disarmament 
negotiations 
2 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 11 
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Compliance with 
non-proliferation, 
arms limitation and 
disarmament 
agreements and 
commitments 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
Conventional arms 
control at the 
regional and 
subregional levels 
p2 
1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 34 
Conventional arms 
control at the 
regional and 
subregional levels 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
Ethical imperatives 
for a nuclear-
weapon-free world 
P10 
2 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 11 
Ethical imperatives 
for a nuclear-
weapon-free world 
2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 9 
Nuclear 
disarmament  
Preamble 
2 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 10 
Nuclear 
disarmament P16 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 54 
Nuclear 
disarmament 
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 5 
Towards a nuclear-
weapon-free world: 
accelerating the 
implementation of 
nuclear 
disarmament 
commitments 
preamble  
2 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 11 
Towards a nuclear-
weapon-free world: 
accelerating the 
implementation of 
nuclear 
disarmament 
commitments p14 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 52 
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COLECCIÓN TRABAJOS DE INVESTIGACIÓN DEL 
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Towards a nuclear-
weapon-free world: 
accelerating the 
implementation of 
nuclear 
disarmament 
commitments p22 
2 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 11 
Towards a nuclear-
weapon-free world: 
accelerating the 
implementation of 
nuclear 
disarmament 
commitments 
2 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 12 
Reducing nuclear 
danger 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Implementation of 
the Convention on 
the Prohibition of 
the Development, 
Production, 
Stockpiling and 
Use of Chemical 
Weapons and on 
Their Destruction 
preamble  
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
Implementation of 
the Convention on 
the Prohibition of 
the Development, 
Production, 
Stockpiling and 
Use of Chemical 
Weapons and on 
Their Destruction 
p2   
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
Implementation of 
the Convention on 
the Prohibition of 
the Development, 
Production, 
Stockpiling and 
Use of Chemical 
Weapons and on 
Their Destruction 
p15 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
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Implementation of 
the Convention on 
the Prohibition of 
the Development, 
Production, 
Stockpiling and 
Use of Chemical 
Weapons and on 
Their Destruction 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
The Arms Trade 
Treaty 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
Nuclear-weapon-
free southern 
hemisphere and 
adjacent areas p6 
preambular 
2 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 12 
Nuclear-weapon-
free southern 
hemisphere and 
adjacent areas 
2 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 0 1 0 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 0 33 
Promotion of 
multilateralism in 
the area of 
disarmament and 
non proliferation 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 27 
United action 
towards the total 
elimination of 
nuclear weapons 19 
preamble 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 52 
United action 
towards the total 
elimination of 
nuclear weapons 20 
pre  
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 55 
United action 
towards the total 
elimination of 
nuclear weapons  
P2 
2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 53 
United action 
towards the total 
elimination of 
nuclear weapons P5 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
United action 
towards the total 
elimination of 
nuclear weapons  
P8 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 52 
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United action 
towards the total 
elimination of 
nuclear weapons 
P20 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
United action 
towards the total 
elimination of 
nuclear weapons 
P21 
0 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 52 
United action 
towards the total 
elimination of 
nuclear weapons 
p28 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
United action 
towards the total 
elimination of 
nuclear weapons 
1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 54 
Implementation of 
the Convention on 
the Prohibition of 
the Use, 
Stockpiling, 
Production and 
Transfer of Anti-
personnel Mines 
and on their 
Destruction 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
Convention on 
Cluster Munitions 
2 2 2 2 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 48 
Follow-up to the 
advisory opinion of 
the International 
Court of Justice on 
the Legality of the 
Threat or Use of 
Nuclear Weapons 
p16 pre  
2 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 11 
Follow-up to the 
advisory opinion of 
the International 
Court of Justice on 
the Legality of the 
Threat or Use of 
Nuclear Weapons 
p2 
2 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 10 
CEI, Centro Adscrito a la Universitat de Barcelona                                 Nº 3/2020, 2 DE SEPTIEMBRE DE 2020 
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M.U. EN DIPLOMACIA Y ORGANIZACIONES INTERNACIONALES 
 
 
113 
Follow-up to the 
advisory opinion of 
the International 
Court of Justice on 
the Legality of the 
Threat or Use of 
Nuclear Weapons 
2 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 9 
Treaty banning the 
production of fissile 
material for nuclear 
weapons or other 
nuclear explosive 
devices 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
Convention on the 
Prohibition of the 
Use of Nuclear 
Weapons 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
The risk of nuclear 
proliferation in the 
Middle East p5  
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
The risk of nuclear 
proliferation in the 
Middle East p6  
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
The risk of nuclear 
proliferation in the 
Middle East 
2 1 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 43 
Comprehensive 
Nuclear-Test Ban 
Treaty  p4  
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
Comprehensive 
Nuclear-Test Ban 
Treaty p5  
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
Comprehensive 
Nuclear-Test Ban 
Treaty 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  AT  BE  BG HR CY CZ DK EE FI FR DE  EL HU  IE IT LV LT LU MT NL PL PT RO SK SI ES SE  UK =  
TABLE 32 
2018 
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Developments in 
the field of 
information and 
telecommunications 
in the context of 
international 
security 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Establishment of a 
nuclear-weapon-
free zone in the 
region of the 
Middle East 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 54 
Conclusion of 
effective 
international 
arrangements to 
assure non nuclear-
weapon States 
against the use or 
threat of use of 
nuclear weapons 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 28 
Prevention of an 
arms race in outer 
space 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
No first placement 
of weapons in outer 
space 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 21 
Further practical 
measures for the 
prevention of an 
arms race in outer 
space 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 28 
Conventional arms 
control at the 
regional and 
subregional levels 
p2 
1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 32 
Conventional arms 
control at the 
regional and 
subregional levels 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
The Arms Trade 
Treaty Pre  
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
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The Arms Trade 
Treaty p4  
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
The Arms Trade 
Treaty p9  
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
The Arms Trade 
Treaty 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
Effects of the use of 
armaments and 
ammunitions 
containing depleted 
uranium 
2 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 0 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 0 39 
Follow-up to the 
2013 high-level 
meeting of the 
General Assembly 
on nuclear 
disarmament p 12 
2 1 1 0 2 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 1 0 0 0 1 2 0 20 
Follow-up to the 
2013 high-level 
meeting of the 
General Assembly 
on nuclear 
disarmament 
2 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 2 0 15 
Promotion of 
multilateralism in 
the area of 
disarmament and 
non proliferation 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 27 
Measures to uphold 
the authority of the 
1925 Geneva 
Protocol 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
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Implementation of 
the Convention on 
the Prohibition of 
the Development, 
Production, 
Stockpiling and 
Use of Chemical 
Weapons and on 
Their Destruction 
Pre 4 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
Implementation of 
the Convention on 
the Prohibition of 
the Development, 
Production, 
Stockpiling and 
Use of Chemical 
Weapons and on 
Their Destruction 
P2 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
Implementation of 
the Convention on 
the Prohibition of 
the Development, 
Production, 
Stockpiling and 
Use of Chemical 
Weapons and on 
Their Destruction 
P3 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
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Implementation of 
the Convention on 
the Prohibition of 
the Development, 
Production, 
Stockpiling and 
Use of Chemical 
Weapons and on 
Their Destruction 
P16 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
Implementation of 
the Convention on 
the Prohibition of 
the Development, 
Production, 
Stockpiling and 
Use of Chemical 
Weapons and on 
Their Destruction 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
Humanitarian 
Consequences of 
Nuclear Weapons 
2 1 1 1 2 0 1 0 2 0 1 2 0 2 1 0 0 1 2 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 2 0 26 
Treaty on the 
Prohibition of 
Nuclear Weapons 
2 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 10 
The Hague Code of 
Conduct against 
Ballistic Missile 
Proliferation 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
Nuclear 
disarmament pre  
2 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 10 
nuclear 
disarmament p16 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 54 
Nuclear 
disarmament 
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 5 
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Consolidation of 
peace through 
practical 
disarmament 
measures 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
 Convention on 
Cluster Munitions 
p14 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 54 
Convention on 
Cluster Munitions 
2 2 2 2 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 49 
Reducing nuclear 
danger 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 28 
Universal 
Declaration on the 
Achievement of a 
Nuclear-Weapon-
Free-World p7 
2 1 1 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 2 1 0 0 0 2 2 0 1 0 0 0 1 2 0 20 
Universal 
Declaration on the 
Achievement of a 
Nuclear-Weapon-
Free-World p9 
2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 0 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 32 
Universal 
Declaration on the 
Achievement of a 
Nuclear-Weapon-
Free-World 
2 0 1 1 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 16 
Decreasing the 
operational 
readiness of nuclear 
weapons systems  
Pre8   
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 53 
Decreasing the 
operational 
readiness of nuclear 
weapons systems 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 52 
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Implementation of 
the Convention on 
the Prohibition of 
the Use, 
Stockpiling, 
Production and 
Transfer of Anti-
personnel Mines 
and on their 
Destruction 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
United action 
towards the total 
elimination of 
nuclear weapons P 
19 pre 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 53 
United action 
towards the total 
elimination of 
nuclear weapons  
P20 pre 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 54 
United action 
towards the total 
elimination of 
nuclear weapons P2 
0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 52 
United action 
towards the total 
elimination of 
nuclear weapons P3 
0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 2 49 
United action 
towards the total 
elimination of 
nuclear weapons P5 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
United action 
towards the total 
elimination of 
nuclear weapons P7 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 53 
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United action 
towards the total 
elimination of 
nuclear weapons  
P10 
1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 51 
United action 
towards the total 
elimination of 
nuclear weapons  
P12 
1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 52 
United action 
towards the total 
elimination of 
nuclear weapons 
P13 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 54 
United action 
towards the total 
elimination of 
nuclear weapons 
p18 
1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 53 
United action 
towards the total 
elimination of 
nuclear weapons  
20 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
 United action 
towards the total 
elimination of 
nuclear weapons P 
21 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
United action 
towards the total 
elimination of 
nuclear weapons 
P31 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
United action 
towards the total 
elimination of 
nuclear weapons 
1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 53 
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Preventing and 
combating illicit 
brokering activities 
P9 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
Preventing and 
combating illicit 
brokering activities 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
Follow-up to the 
advisory opinion of 
the International 
Court of Justice on 
the Legality of the 
Threat or Use of 
Nuclear Weapons  
Pre9 
2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 0 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 34 
Follow-up to the 
advisory opinion of 
the International 
Court of Justice on 
the Legality of the 
Threat or Use of 
Nuclear Weapons 
Pre17 
2 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 10 
Follow-up to the 
advisory opinion of 
the International 
Court of Justice on 
the Legality of the 
Threat or Use of 
Nuclear Weapons 
P2 
2 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 10 
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Follow-up to the 
advisory opinion of 
the International 
Court of Justice on 
the Legality of the 
Threat or Use of 
Nuclear Weapons 
2 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 11 
Treaty banning the 
production of fissile 
material for nuclear 
weapons or other 
nuclear explosive 
devices 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
Ethical imperatives 
for a nuclear-
weapon-free world  
11pre 
2 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 13 
Ethical imperatives 
for a nuclear-
weapon-free world 
2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 8 
The illicit trade in 
small arms and 
light weapons in all 
its aspects pre 7 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
The illicit trade in 
small arms and 
light weapons in all 
its aspects p6 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
Towards a nuclear-
weapon-free world: 
accelerating the 
implementation of 
nuclear 
disarmament 
commitments pre 4 
2 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 36 
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Towards a nuclear-
weapon-free world: 
accelerating the 
implementation of 
nuclear 
disarmament 
commitments pre12 
2 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 10 
Towards a nuclear-
weapon-free world: 
accelerating the 
implementation of 
nuclear 
disarmament 
commitments p13 
2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 34 
Towards a nuclear-
weapon-free world: 
accelerating the 
implementation of 
nuclear 
disarmament 
commitments p15 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 52 
Towards a nuclear-
weapon-free world: 
accelerating the 
implementation of 
nuclear 
disarmament 
commitments p24 
2 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 10 
Towards a nuclear-
weapon-free world: 
accelerating the 
implementation of 
nuclear 
disarmament 
commitments 
2 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 11 
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Fourth Conference 
of Nuclear-
Weapon-Free 
Zones and 
Mongolia, 2020 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 54 
Transparency and 
confidence-building 
measures in outer 
space activities 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
Missiles  2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
Nuclear 
disarmament 
verification 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
Convention on the 
Prohibition of the 
Use of Nuclear 
Weapons 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
The risk of nuclear 
proliferation in the 
Middle East pre 5 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 55 
The risk of nuclear 
proliferation in the 
Middle East pre 6 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 55 
The risk of nuclear 
proliferation in the 
Middle East 
2 1 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 43 
Strengthening of 
security and 
cooperation in the 
Mediterranean 
region  p2 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
Strengthening of 
security and 
cooperation in the 
Mediterranean 
region p5 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 55 
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Strengthening of 
security and 
cooperation in the 
Mediterranean 
region 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
Comprehensive 
Nuclear-Test Ban 
Treaty pre 4 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
Comprehensive 
Nuclear-Test Ban 
Treaty pre 7 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
Comprehensive 
Nuclear-Test Ban 
Treaty 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 56 
 
 
